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ASSUMING THE RISK: TORT LAW, POLICY, AND




Since its inception in the mid-nineteenth century, the tort doctrine
of assumption of risk has served as legal shorthand for the idea that
individuals are responsible for the consequences of their own risk-tak-
ing preferences. Indeed, one of the most famous Latin maxims in the
common law corpus-volenti non fit injuria-indicates that those who
freely take chances have only themselves to blame for their harms.'
Yet this seemingly simple legal concept has been freighted with politi-
cal and moral tensions for over a century, and it has been attacked as
"sinister ' 2 and "dangerously misleading."'3 As Justice Felix Frank-
furter pointedly wrote,
The phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustration of the
extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase
begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repeti-
tion; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscrim-
inatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory
ideas. 4
This Article uses a case study approach to take a fresh look at the
assumption of risk doctrine. Focusing on ski accidents, it argues that
t We are grateful to Tom Baker, John Fagan, Umberto Izzo, Gideon Parchamovsky, Robert
Rabin, and all of the participants in the 15th Annual Clifford Symposium for their helpful
comments and feedback. Timothy Von Dulm and the rest of the staff of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School Library provided extraordinary research help. Support for this paper
was generously provided by a University of Pennsylvania Law School Summer Research Grant.
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Stan-
ford Law School (2008-2009).
** J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; Law Clerk to the Honorable Kent A. Jor-
dan, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
1. See Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).
2. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 413 (1973).
3. Stephen D. Sugarman, The Monsanto Lecture: Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV.
833, 835-36 (1997) (suggesting that "when we are tempted to say 'assumption of risk' we should
instead say something else," such as "'no breach,' 'no duty,' 'no cause,' and 'no proximate
cause,"' because assumption of risk is an inaccurate and "confusing substitute for each of
them").
4. Tiller v. Atd. Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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although judges and legal scholars have overwhelmingly engaged in
the idea of assumed risk as a matter of legal doctrine,5 the political,
economic, and ideological dimensions of the assumption of risk are
both more interesting and more important. Doctrinally, conflicts over
ski injuries vividly illustrate why assumed risk points in such different
directions. From one perspective, skiers are precisely the types of in-
dividuals who ought to bear the cost of their injuries. Skiing is a
purely recreational activity in which people freely chose to participate.
It is clearly dangerous, resulting in injuries that range from minor
scrapes to physical impairment and death. Many of the risks it entails
are obvious: falls due to conditions such as ice and moguls, and colli-
sions with objects such as trees, ski towers, and snowmaking equip-
ment. 6 However, it is also the case that the owners and operators of
ski resorts can reduce the overall incidence and cost of accidents by
taking reasonable precautions to eliminate unnecessary dangers on
the slopes. 7 Determining liability for ski accidents thus requires a
complex calculus of risk that accepts the reality that skiing is danger-
ous and will inevitably lead to some injuries, reflects the individualistic
ethos of American legal culture by holding skiers accountable for
their actions,8 and creates incentives both for skiers to exercise care
when skiing and for resort owners and operators to offer skiers a rea-
sonably safe skiing environment. 9 In almost every case that we have
examined, reasonable minds could and do differ on the question of
liability; there is no cookbook-like formula for drawing a line between
the risks that are legitimately taken by the skier and those risks that
embody the carelessness of defendant ski resort owners and
operators.
But there is far more to an understanding of the assumption of risk
doctrine than is revealed by a focus on tort law doctrine alone. Cru-
cial to the assumed risk debate is the powerful influence of politics
and economics on the manner in which courts define and operational-
5. As every torts casebook indicates, the assumption of risk doctrine is not a single doctrine,
but rather a set of more-or-less related doctrines. This Article focuses on primary implied as-
sumption of risk, not implied or express assumption of risk, the firefighter's rule, or other legal
concepts that have been called "the assumption of risk."
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See infra text accompanying note 208.
8. In 1906, Francis Bohlen wrote that assumption of risk was "a terse expression of the indi-
vidualistic tendency of the common law, which, proceeding from the people and asserting their
liberties, naturally regards the freedom of individual action as the keystone of the whole struc-
ture." Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARv. L. REV. 14, 14 (1906).
9. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985) (discussing the high degree




ize risks. 10 The ski industry is essential to the economy of some states,
and the insurance industry is critical to the successful operation of the
ski industry. Together, they have lobbied aggressively for protective
state legislation. The result has been the legislative enactment of ski
safety statutes that are intended to shield the industry from liability.
For several decades, these statutes have structured the legal conflict
over ski accidents. 12 Allocating responsibility for accidents on the
slopes, therefore, is fraught with economic and political tension, and
the seemingly jurisprudential and doctrinal debate over the assump-
tion of risk is, in reality, heavily shaped by the political and cultural
climate in which it exists.' 3
Our goal in this Article is neither to argue in favor of an existing
doctrinal interpretation of assumed risk nor to propose an alternative
formulation. Although we are in accord with many of the doctrine's
critics and are sympathetic to the view that it is conceptually imper-
fect, we are more interested in analyzing how the assumption of risk
operates in practice than we are in engaging a set of hypotheticals. 14
What one learns from a detailed examination of ski accidents, we ar-
gue, is that regardless of the scholarly criticism of the assumption of
risk doctrine, the far-ranging material interests implicated by the doc-
trine guarantee its continued salience. Powerful political and eco-
nomic actors with links to the ski industry value the idea of assumed
risk, and they have worked hard to keep the concept alive in the judi-
cial realm.' 5 The financial interests of those actors have caused them
to promote the view that the cost of accidents suffered by skiers
should be borne by the skiers because those who ski are presumed to
10. See infra Part III.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The question of how to allocate liability in ski accident cases is part of a more general
social conversation over risk and responsibility that animates the broader tort reform debate.
Almost every important work that has attacked tort litigation in the United States has champi-
oned the importance of individual responsibility and bemoaned the perceived tendency of indi-
viduals to take risks but avoid responsibility for the harms that result from such risks. See
generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL Dis-
COURSE (1991); WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, ME-
DIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:
How LAW Is SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION:
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); CHARLES J. SYKES, A
NATION OF VICrIMS: THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN CHARACTER (1992).
14. Similarly, Peter Schuck argues that the assumption of risk doctrine implicates "evolving
social norms concerning fundamental issues of morality: the meaning of fairness, reciprocity in
relationships, the extent of free will, individual responsibility for choice, and the like." See Peter
H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899. 912 (1993).
15. See infra text accompanying note 110.
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have knowingly engaged in a risky activity. By pointing to politics and
economics as a critical factor in the persistence of the doctrine of as-
sumed risk, we seek to politically and culturally contextualize what we
believe has been an unduly narrow legal debate among tort law
scholars.
Moreover, by analyzing litigation over ski accidents in three ski-in-
tensive states-Vermont, Colorado, and California-it becomes clear
that the outcome of a ski-related conflict that is decided under the
rubric of assumed risk is not mechanically determined by the exis-
tence of forcefully articulated material interests. In fact, defendants in
California have fared far better than those in Vermont and Colorado,
even though California is the only one of the three states that has not
passed a statute designed to shield the ski industry from liability. 16
Vermont, in contrast, was home to the first such legislation, but the
courts in that state are as likely to award damages to injured skiers as
they are to find for defendants. 17 In short, we argue that politics and
financial interest are critical to the "law-in-action" of assumed risk,
but we emphasize how diverse and sometimes unexpected judicial
outcomes emerge despite the shadow of such influences. 18
In Part II of this Article, we describe the emergence of skiing as a
popular sport in the United States, we highlight its economic import in
particular states, and we present general data on the risks of skiing
through an overview of ski-related accidents and deaths. Part III re-
views the historical and conceptual development of the assumption of
risk as a tort law doctrine, detailing both the contemporary criticisms
leveled against the doctrine and its application to cases that involve
injured skiers. In Part IV we turn to the politics of the assumption of
risk doctrine and tell the story of how the National Ski Areas Associa-
tion and the insurance industry lobbied state legislatures in an effort
to codify the assumption of risk doctrine in order to protect the indus-
try from potentially expensive personal injury cases. Part V provides
a detailed assessment of the case law in three states in which skiing
has particular economic importance: Vermont, Colorado, and Califor-
nia. Although there are various types of ski-related claims-including
ski resort employees who sue their employers for injuries suffered on
the slopes, skiers who sue ski equipment manufacturers, and skiers
who sue one another-our emphasis is on litigation brought by in-
jured skiers against ski resorts because those cases are the most com-
mon, involve the largest sums of money, and most directly implicate
16. See infra Part V.C.
17. See infra Part V.A.
18. See infra Part V.
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the notion of assumed risk. Two of the states we investigate, Vermont
and Colorado, have ski safety statutes that are meant to shield resort
owners and operators from liability, whereas California has not en-
acted protective legislation. Intriguingly, we find that despite the lack
of legislation, defendants fare better in California than elsewhere,
while plaintiffs have been particularly successful in Colorado, which is
home to an early statute that was later revised and strengthened.
Overall, although the data is imperfect, a careful look at judicial opin-
ions from the past several decades reveals that regardless of whether
plaintiffs or defendants prevail, the doctrine of assumption of risk re-
mains a critical part of the case law. In the face of persistent academic
criticism and predictions by some influential scholars that the assump-
tion of risk doctrine was a relic of the past whose disappearance would
usher in an era of plaintiff recovery,1 9 the doctrine continues to exert a
powerful influence on how disputes over ski-related harms are re-
solved. In Part V, we conclude by reviewing the central claims of the
Article and draw analogies to other areas of the law in which the as-
sumption of risk doctrine remains critical.
II. SKIING IN AMERICA
An article discussing legislative efforts in Vermont to impose the
burden of ski injuries on injured skiers states, "Give ski areas the
courage to reduce the risks they can, skiers the strength to accept
those that they cannot, and juries the wisdom to know the differ-
ence. ' '20 The struggle to determine those risks that ski areas have a
legal duty to reduce and those that will be borne by skiers has loomed
large throughout the history of American skiing.
While the origins of skiing in America can be traced to 1854,2l the
sport did not become popular until the end of World War II, when
soldiers returned from Europe and brought ski equipment into the
United States.2 2 The construction of the Interstate Highway System,
authorized by President Dwight Eisenhower through the passage of
19. See Schuck, supra note 14, at 911-12 ("The dominant approach has been to eliminate or
narrow the defense, thereby facilitating plaintiffs' recoveries.") (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 493-95 (5th ed. 1984)).
20. Beth Robinson, Playing It Safe: Allocating the Risk of Harm on the Slopes, 25 VT. B.J. &
L. DIG., Mar. 1999, at 15, 15.
21. There are numerous newspaper records of competitive skiing among California mining
camp populations. See E. JOHN B. ALLEN, FROM SKISPORT TO SKIING: ONE HUNDRED YEARS
OF AN AMERICAN SPORT, 1840-1940, at 21-28 (1993).
22. See Peter Kaineg, Chris Van Valkenburg & Carsten Winsnes, Issues Facing Ski Safety
Research 6 (Apr. 26, 2006) (unpublished interactive qualifying project report submitted in par-
tial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science, Worcester Polytechnic
Institute) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ski Safety Research].
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the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act, contributed to the growth of ski-
ing by improving access to ski areas in remote and difficult-to-access
places. 23 Over the second half of the twentieth century, the sport
quickly evolved into a $10 billion industry.24 In 2006, there were 485
ski resorts operating in the United States,25 with an estimated 6.4 mil-
lion skiers and 5.2 million snowboarders who made 55.1 million visits
to the resorts during the 2006-2007 season. 26
Owning a ski resort has always been a profitable endeavor. Ac-
cording to the 2005/06 Ski Resort Industry Research Compendium of
the National Ski Areas Association (NSAA),27 which includes re-
sponses from over 200 resorts, accounting for 47.9 million ski visits, 28
the average gross revenue of a resort is $21.9 million, with an average
operating profit margin of 24.4% or $5.3 million per ski resort area. 29
The typical price of a weekend lift ticket now exceeds $60.30 Ski re-
23. See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 374 (1956) (current version at 23 U.S.C
§ 101 (2006)). The bill, commonly referred to as the National Interstate and Defense Highways
Act, appropriated $25 billion for 41,000 miles of interstate highways and was the largest public
works project in America at the time. PENNSYLVANIA HIGHWAY INFORMATION Ass'N, ROAD
TO PROSPERITY: 21ST CENTURY TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 4, available at www.aaapa.
org/Road2Prosperity-secureweb.pdf (citing Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (1956)).
24. NAT'L SKI AREA Ass'N & RCC Assocs. (NSAA), 2005/06 SKI RESORT INDUSTRY RE-
SEARCH COMPENDIUM 6, 9 (2006), available at http://www.nsaa.org/nsaa/marketing/docs/0506-re-
search-compendium.pdf. This figure was calculated by multiplying the 2005-2006 average gross
revenue per ski resort ($21.9 million) by the number of ski resorts in the United States at the
time (478 ski resorts).
25. See Press Release, NSAA, 481 Ski Resorts in Operation During 2007-2008 Season (July
20, 2008), http://www.nsaa.org/nsaa/press/operating-ski-areas.asp (outlining the number of ski re-
sorts in America by ski season from 1985 through 2007).
26. Press Release, NSAA, Final Report Indicates 55.1 Million Visits in 2006/07 (Aug. 9 2007),
http://www.nsaa.org/nsaa/press/0708/kottke-2007.asp ("A skier/snowboarder visit is defined as
one person visiting a ski area for all or part of a day or night, and includes full- and half-day,
night, complimentary, adult, child, season and other types of tickets."). Over the last ten seasons
(1997-1998 through 2006-2007), there has been an average of 55.57 million visits recorded annu-
ally. Id.; see also NSAA, Facts About Skiing/Snowboarding Safety, http://www.nsaa.org/nsaa/
press/facts-ski-snbd-safety.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2007).
13.9 percent of snowboarders also ski, and conversely, 12.8 percent of skiers also
snowboard. Therefore, the total on-slope participants were calculated at 9.2 million.
(13.9 percent of 5.1 million snowboarders equals 708,900. 5.1 million minus 708,900
equals 4.4 million snowboarders. 12.8 percent of 5.5 million skiers equals 704,000. 5.5
million minus 704,000 equals 4.8 million skiers.)
Facts About Skiing/Snowboarding Safety, supra.
27. NSAA, About the National Ski Areas Association, http://www.nsaa.org/nsaa/home/about.
asp ("The [NSAA] is the trade association for ski area owners and operators. It represents 326
alpine resorts that account for more than 90 percent of the skier/snowboarder visits nationwide.
Additionally, it has 400 supplier members who provide equipment, goods and services to the
mountain resort industry."). Id.
28. NSAA, supra note 24, at 2.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 5, 9.
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sorts derive 46.3% of their revenues from lift ticket sales, and the
NSAA considers the ability to regularly increase the price of lift tick-
ets to be a critical factor in the overall financial health of the business
because lift tickets are the single largest revenue producer of the
industry.31
Ski resorts do not only benefit their individual or corporate owners.
The ski industry also plays an enormous role in many state economies.
In New Hampshire, for example, the ski industry provides ten percent
of all jobs in the winter months, 32 and the California Ski Industry As-
sociation reports that "the California winter sports industry generates
$500 million annually to the economy, employs 15,000 people, and
hosts an average of eight million skiers seasonally. ' 33 Many "ski
safety statutes" 34 candidly describe the important role that skiing
plays in the state's economy, thereby alluding to the need for the state
legislature to protect the industry from crushing liability. In short, ski-
ing is a major industry that is critical to the economy of some states
and offers an attractive recreational opportunity to a large number of
people. But it also results in a significant number of serious accidents.
Although everyone involved in skiing agrees that it can be danger-
ous, it is surprisingly difficult to obtain reliable information about ski-
related injuries or deaths.35 Aside from a series of research projects
that examine patterns of ski injury against the backdrop of equipment,
environmental conditions, or both,36 most of the available data re-
garding actual fatalities and serious injuries comes from the ski indus-
try itself.37 The NSAA reports that during the past ten years there has
31. Id. at 9-10.
32. Keep Winter Cool, Why Should I Care?, http://www.keepwintercool.org/whyshouldicare.
html ("Keep Winter Cool is a partnership between NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil) and the National Ski Areas Association (NSAA) to raise visibility and public understanding
of global warming and spotlight opportunities that exist right now to start fixing the problem.").




34. See Charles J. Sanders & Jacqueline Gayner, The Cold Truth: Have Attorneys Really Chil-
led the Ski Industry?, 2 FORDHAM E'4T. MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F. 125, 131-32 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Nicholas Bakalar, Summer Sports Are Among the Safest, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2008, at F7 (noting that summer sports are relatively safe and that "the most dangerous outdoor
recreational activity by a wide margin is snowboarding, followed by sledding," citing a study
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).
36. See, e.g., Jasper Shealy, Carl F. Ettlinger & Robert Johnson, Signal Detection Theory: A
Model for Evaluating Release/Retention Criteria in Alpine Ski-Binding-Book Systems, in 12 SKI-
ING TRAUMA & SAFETY 120-31 (Robert J. Johnson ed., 1999).
37. Ski Safety Research, supra note 22, at 1 (noting that, with the exception of Sugarbush,
"most ski areas are not cooperative in conducting injury studies").
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been an average of 43.6 serious injuries 38 and 39.8 ski- or snowboard-
related deaths per year.39 During the 2007-2008 season, 60.5 million
visits by skiers and snowboarders resulted in 41 serious injuries and 53
fatalities;40 the vast majority of accident victims are men: 28 men died
on the slopes, and 25 men suffered serious injury.41 It is important to
note that one's chance of dying or experiencing serious injury when
skiing or snowboarding is relatively small. Indeed, in contrast to the
53 fatalities per 60.5 million visits by skiers and snowboarders in
2007-2008, in 2006, there were 3,600 drowning deaths per 58 million
swimmers, and 1,100 fatalities per 43.1 million bicyclists.4 2 Yet the
NSAA's emphasis on death and serious injury, and its seemingly nar-
row definition of what constitutes a serious injury, may underplay the
real risks faced by skiers and snowboarders. Although the NSAA
does not provide public data on the full range of injuries that occur on
the slopes, Jasper Shealy, a professor of engineering at Rochester In-
stitute of Technology, has studied ski injuries for three decades and
offers a dramatically different perspective from that of the NSAA. 43
He reports nearly 15,000 skier and snowboarder injuries annually,
many of which could potentially end up in court.4 4 With figures rang-
ing from the NSSA's reported annual average of 43.7 serious injuries
to Shealy's claim of almost 15,000 hurt skiers, the lack of fine-grained
data on the number and type of ski injuries in the United States makes
it difficult to (1) estimate the number of tort claims that could be
brought by skiers, and (2) compare it to the number of claims actually
filed, the number of cases resolved by judicial opinion, and the num-
ber of estimated settlements. But with over 80 deaths or catastrophic
injuries occurring on the slopes each year, and thousands-perhaps
tens of thousands-of additional personal harms suffered by skiers
and snowboarders, the potential for legal conflict over who is respon-
sible for such harms is significant.
38. NSAA, Facts About Skiing/Snowboarding, supra note 26 (defining "serious injuries" as
"paraplegics, serious head and other serious injuries").
39. Id.
40. Id. ("The rate of fatality converts to .40 per million skier/snowboarder visits.... The rate
of serious injury ... was .73 per million skier/snowboarder visits.").
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Sarah Tuff, Safety on the Slopes: Easy to Say but Harder to Ensure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,




III. TORT LAW AND THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK
A. Historical Development
There have always been individuals who are willing to engage in
activities that others consider overly dangerous. But it was not until
the latter half of the nineteenth century that the common law explic-
itly addressed the legal consequences of injuries that resulted from
risky undertakings. Tort law was becoming an independent area of
the law in that era, distinct from contracts, property, and criminal law,
but in many instances, universal notions of duty were overshadowed
by an emphasis on status relationships. Francis Hilliard's 1859 book
on torts, the first such treatise to appear in the United States, intro-
duced the notion of assumption of risk to American courts. Hilliard's
view of assumed risk made clear that the concept of assumed risk was
closely tied to the relationship between the parties: "[I]f a defective
condition 'was known to the servant. . . and the servant continued in
the service he assumed the risk himself." 45 Over the next several de-
cades, the idea of assumption of risk was freed from the specific con-
text of the master-servant relationship posited by Hilliard. Francis
Wharton's 1878 Treatise on the Law of Negligence, for example, de-
scribed the assumption of risk doctrine as a "general principle that a
party cannot recover for injury he incurs in risks, themselves legiti-
mate, to which he intelligently submits himself. '46 In 1895, Charles
Warren underscored the rejection of status relationships as the under-
lying justification for applying the assumption of risk doctrine by
presenting assumed risk as a rule of law regarding a plaintiff's conduct
that is a part of the general law of negligence.4 7
By the first years of the twentieth century, the law of torts became
further refined, and the theory of negligence was increasingly used to
limit defendants' liability. As a result, the idea of assumption of risk
was widely summed up by the Latin phrase volenti non fit injuria (to a
willing person, no injury is done), with courts generally unsympathetic
to injured plaintiffs who made a decision to knowingly engage in cer-
tain risks.48 In Lamson v. American Axe & Tool Co., Oliver Wendell
Holmes denied recovery to Lamson, an employee of an axe manufac-
turer who was injured when a hatchet fell from a defective rack.49 Al-
45. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 42 (expanded
ed. 2003) (quoting F. HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 467 (3d ed. 1866)).
46. FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 181 (2d ed. 1878).
47. See WHITE, supra note 45, at 42-43.
48. Jane P. North, Employees Assumption of Risk: Real or Illusory Choice? 52 TENN. L. REV.
35, 38 (1984).
49. 58 N.E. 585, 585 (Mass. 1900).
2010]
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though Lamson had expressed concern about the stability of the rack
and the safety of working underneath it, his employer insisted that he
would be forced to either accept the condition of the rack or quit his
job.50 In Holmes' view, the employee "appreciated the danger more
than any one else. He perfectly understood what was likely to hap-
pen. . . . He stayed, and took the risk."' t As a result, he was the
author of his own fate, and consequently, he must bear the costs of his
accident.
Holmes' approach to assumed risk held sway for the first several
decades of the twentieth century, and it left plaintiffs with little hope
of recovering for injuries that resulted from their own informed
choices.52 Justice Benjamin Cardozo's 1929 opinion in Murphy v.
Steeplechase Amusement Co.-a colorful case involving a young man
injured on a Coney Island amusement ride called "the Flopper"-fur-
ther solidified the notion that those who take risks must bear the con-
sequences. 53 Justice Cardozo wrote,
Volenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such a sport accepts
the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and neces-
sary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his antagonist or
a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the ball....
The plaintiff was not seeking a retreat for meditation .... The tim-
orous may stay at home.54
According to Justice Cardozo, the plaintiff's injury was the result of
"the very hazard that was invited and foreseen. '55 As such, liability
could not be imposed on Steeplechase, which had merely provided an
entertaining diversion for willing participants. Like Lamson's hatchet
wound, Murphy's injuries were the result of his decision to knowingly
and willingly take a risk, and he alone was responsible for the unfortu-
nate consequence. "There would have been no point to the whole
thing, no adventure about it, if the risk had not been there," Cardozo
wrote. "The very name, above the gate, 'the Flopper,' was warning to
the timid. '' 56
The approach to assumed risk that emerged in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and that was hardened by Holmes and Cardozo in the early
twentieth century, began to erode after World War II, as tort law
50. Id. at 585 ("The plaintiff complained to the superintendent ... [and h]e was answered, in
substance, that he would have to use the racks or leave.").
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).
53. Id.





moved toward a greater emphasis on compensation. The introduction
of liability insurance played an important role in that transforma-
tion,57 as did social norms that conceptualized accidental harms as a
societal rather than an individual problem. Starting in the late 1940s,
and accelerating in the 1960s and 1970s, legal scholars and the courts
displayed a growing skepticism of the narrow approach to the assump-
tion of risk doctrine-which consistently imposed the cost of accidents
on the injured-and embraced a newfound willingness to provide
awards to plaintiffs whose claims would have been denied by earlier
courts. Doctrinal and legislative innovations, like strict liability and
worker's compensation, provided avenues to redress that enabled
plaintiffs to sidestep the law of negligence and the possibility that their
claims would falter with the successful invocation of the assumption of
risk doctrine. 58 The result was that injured parties, even those who
knowingly had embraced particular risks, were more likely to be com-
pensated for their harms than in any other period in American
history.5 9
The expansion of liability that reached a peak in the 1970s would
prove to be short lived. In response to the rise in unemployment and
high inflation of the 1970s, in the early 1980s, the Reagan Administra-
tion ushered in an era of conservative retrenchment that emphasized
the need to heal the ailing economy and shrink the size of the federal
government. 60 Reflecting the tenor of the times, by the mid-1980s,
tort law scholars and courts began to move away from their emphasis
on compensation and instead embraced values like deterrence. Theo-
ries based on economic concepts such as market efficiency took prece-
dence over social welfare concerns and distributive justice theories,
and skepticism about the government's ability to effectively concep-
tualize and implement solutions to social problems led to an emphasis
on individual responsibility.6 1 With its inherently deterrent-based ra-
tionale and its focus on individual behavior, the notion of assumption
of risk was ready-made for the times. Once again, courts were in the
57. See WHITE, supra note 45, at 149.
58. Id. at 245.
59. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 521-23 (3d ed. 2005); KEN-
NETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRES-
SIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 171-72 (2008).
60. See generally HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 13.
61. Id. at 22 ("We refer especially to the specific 'ethic of individualism' that emphasizes self-
reliance, toughness, and autonomy-qualities that are posed as being central to progress and
'getting along' in a market economy.").
2010] 269
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position, in Holmes' famous phrase, to let the "loss from accident lie
where it falls."'62
For over a century, therefore, courts have wrestled with the notion
of assumed risk, sometimes emphasizing that individuals who know-
ingly take chances are liable for the cost of their injuries, and other
times displaying an unwillingness to absolve defendants of responsibil-
ity for plaintiffs' injuries. During most of that period, defendants
could extinguish potential liability by presenting convincing evidence
that a plaintiff's careless conduct contributed to the injuries. In the
many accidents in which both parties were careless, therefore, the bur-
den was borne exclusively by the injured plaintiff, and the defendant
had no liability for the harm. Known as contributory negligence, this
doctrine represented a formidable bar to recovery. 63 Since the 1960s,
the absolutism of contributory negligence has given way to a system of
comparative negligence, which emphasizes the relative degrees of
fault borne by each party.64 Although these rules vary by state, in
almost every instance a plaintiff who can establish that she was less at
fault than the defendant can recover, with recovery measured by the
defendant's degree of fault. For example, a defendant who was 75%
responsible for the accident will pay 75% of the damages.
The doctrines of contributory and comparative negligence are
closely related to the assumption of risk doctrine. Under the assump-
tion of risk doctrine, a defendant would escape liability after proving
that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of the defendant's negligence.
Similarly, under a contributory negligence scheme, a defendant would
also escape liability after convincing the court that the plaintiff had
acted carelessly. Both contributory negligence and the assumption of
risk doctrine, therefore, incorporated the classic all-or-nothing reason-
ing of the common law. Moreover, as the black-and-white reasoning
of contributory negligence has yielded to the more nuanced analysis
of comparative fault, states with comparative fault statutes have had
to reassess the assumption of risk defense in many types of claims.
62. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94 (1881); cf Schuck, supra note 14,
at 902 ("The doctrine of informed consent in healthcare shared in the more general expansion of
American tort liability that proceeded well into the 1980's and that now appears to have
stabilized.").
63. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 353 (8th ed. 2004) (defining contributory negligence as
"[t]he principle that completely bars a plaintiff's recovery if the damage suffered is partly the
plaintiff's own fault" and noting that "[m]ost states have abolished this doctrine and have
adopted instead a comparative-negligence scheme").
64. Id. at 300 (defining comparative negligence as "[t]he principle that reduces a plaintiff's
recovery proportionally to the plaintiff's degree of fault in causing the damage, rather than bar-




B. The Assumption of Risk Docrtine in Contemporary Tort Law
To better understand the link between comparative fault and as-
sumption of risk, it is essential to recognize that courts have identified
three types of cases in which risks may be assumed. One involves the
express assumption of risk, in which, for example, the skier signs a
liability waiver whereby the skier agrees to accept the risks of skiing
and releases all possible defendants from liability for her potential in-
juries.65 Express assumption of risk cases may also involve the fine
print on the back of a stadium ticket, parking ticket, ski lift ticket, or
the agreement one signs when joining a health club. The question
raised by such cases is whether express agreements should be en-
forced or whether the unequal bargaining power of the parties negates
the plaintiff's consent, regardless of the plaintiff's awareness of certain
dangers and apparent choice to confront them.66 Cases involving acci-
dents on the slopes have been treated inconsistently by the courts,
with some invalidating express agreements on so-called public policy
grounds,67 and others finding that the agreements are enforceable. 68
In the second type of assumption of risk case-primary implied as-
sumption of risk-the plaintiff's consent is implied rather than ex-
plicit.69 The implied assumption of risk cases focus on the relationship
between the parties and the behavior and knowledge of the plaintiffs.
Industrial workers, for example, may have tacitly consented to dan-
gerous working conditions and even to the negligence of their employ-
ers, and on that basis their claims for compensation may be denied.
Likewise, spectators at sporting events may choose a seat in a part of
the stadium that is not protected by screens, thereby exposing them-
65. See, e.g., Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 796 (Vt. 1995) (holding that liability waivers
that "releas[e] defendants from all liability resulting from negligence, are void as contrary to
public policy").
66. See Schuck, supra note 14, at 910.
Legislatures often prohibit and courts often invalidate [express agreements] as a matter
of public policy. Stigmatizing this type of waiver as a contract of adhesion, they empha-
size the consumer's lack of bargaining power, alternatives, risk information, and aware-
ness of the waiver-in essence, her lack of informed consent to the risk.
67. See, e.g., Dalury, 670 A.2d at 796.
68. See, e.g., Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (af-
firming summary judgment for the defendant ski area in an action brought by the plaintiff for
injuries suffered while in ski school because "in consideration for being allowed to enroll in the
ski school, [the plaintiff] specifically agreed to release Snow Summit and its employees from any
liability for injuries caused by participating in the ski lesson").
69. See, e.g., Daniel E. Wanat, Torts and Sporting Events: Spectator and Participant Injuries-
Using Defendant's Duty to Limit Liability As an Alternative to the Defense of Primary Implied
Assumption of Risk, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 237 (2001).
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selves to errant balls.70 These cases generally focus on "defining the
contours of the legal duty that a given class of defendants ... owed to
an injured plaintiff."' 71 In cases where no duty is owed by the defen-
dant, courts often conclude that the plaintiff assumed the risk.
The third type of assumption of risk case, the secondary implied
assumption of risk, involves cases in which the defendant breached a
legal duty and the plaintiff knowingly consented to the risks created
by the defendant's conduct.72 In the era before the adoption of com-
parative fault, there was little reason to distinguish between primary
and secondary implied assumption of risk because plaintiffs were
barred from recovery in both types of cases. But with the advent of
comparative fault, cases of so-called secondary implied assumption of
risk no longer barred recovery for plaintiffs. Instead, courts began to
examine whether plaintiffs voluntarily and reasonably took risks that
were created by defendants' lack of due care, and they then appor-
tioned the loss according to what they considered to be the relative
responsibility of the parties.
All three types of assumed risk cases-express, primary implied,
and secondary implied-are at play in claims that result from skiing
accidents. These cases quickly make clear that the categorical divi-
sions are muddier in practice than they may appear when viewed in
abstraction.73 In many respects, express assumption of risk cases are
more about contract law than tort law.74 But in certain circumstances,
70. The primary implied assumption of risk doctrine has been the subject of considerable
academic commentary. For example, Steven Sugarman argues that it is more doctrinally coher-
ent to treat such cases as involving basic questions of duty and breach than to consider them
under the assumed risk rubric. See Sugarman, supra note 3, at 836 ("Many cases in which the
courts talk about 'assumption of risk' are best understood as ones in which there simply has been
no negligence, or more precisely, 'no breach' of the duty to exercise due care."). In Sugarman's
view, liability in a case involving a sports spectator should hinge on the question of whether the
stadium owner had a duty to the spectator, and if so whether the duty was breached. In the
absence of a duty or the breach of a duty there is no liability. The result-no liability-is identi-
cal to the one that would be reached by concluding that the plaintiff had assumed the risk by
selecting an unprotected stadium seat. But the focus of the analysis shifts from the behavior of
the plaintiff to the behavior of the defendant, and thus enables courts to avoid the language of
assumed risk. See Sugarman, supra note 3, at 836-37.
71. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 700 (Cal. 1992).
72. See, e.g., Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 508 S.E.2d
565, 571 (S.C. 1998) ("Secondary implied assumption of risk, on the other hand, arises when the
plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk created by the defendant's negligence.").
73. Judge Richard Cardamone accurately described how courts have struggled with the "vex-
ing phrase 'assumption of the risk,"' calling it a "legal maze." Dillworth v. Gambardella, 970
F.2d 1113, 1114-15 (2d Cir. 1992).
74. Many state courts disfavor exculpatory agreements. See, e.g., Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670
A.2d 795, 796 (Vt. 1995) (holding that liability waivers that "releas[e] defendants from all liabil-
ity from negligence, are void as contrary to public policy"). The Colorado Supreme Court holds
that "parental indemnity provisions, liability waivers that parents sign on behalf of their minor
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courts that hear a claim about an expressly assumed skiing risk use the
case as an opportunity to explore the idea of the assumption of risk
more broadly. It is these cases to which we pay careful attention. Fre-
quently, courts do not precisely distinguish between primary and sec-
ondary implied assumption of risk.75 Both risks are closely tied to
what courts and legislatures deem "inherent" risks-the idea that par-
ticipants in sports consent to the risks inherent in a particular sport,
like horseback riders who consent to the possibility of being thrown
off their horses, and skiers who consent to the possibility of hitting an
icy patch or a mogul. Many courts use the language of inherent risk as
a way of discussing and contextualizing the doctrine of assumption of
risk. For example, if a plaintiff's injury results from a risk inherent to
the sport of skiing, she is said to have assumed the risk. The idea of
inherent risks is contested, in part because the concept is not self-de-
fining. In some cases, inherent risks are defined as those that cannot
be removed by due care,76 whereas in other cases, courts imply that
even some risks that could be relatively easily remedied are inherent
in skiing.77
In examining cases from Vermont, Colorado, and California, we will
use the phrase "assumption of risk" or "inherent risk" as these
phrases are used by attorneys and courts: to capture the idea that lia-
bility, at least in part, depends upon whether a plaintiff knowingly and
voluntarily confronted a risk and upon the nature of the risk that was
confronted. Throughout the Article, we invoke the phrases "assump-
tion of risk" and "inherent risk" not because we are unaware of the
academic debate about their logical and doctrinal coherence but be-
cause we consider those debates to be less important than the political
and economic dimensions of conflicts that revolve around actions of
risk-bearing individuals. As disputes over ski-related accidents make
clear, state courts, judges, juries, state lawmakers, and lobbyists con-
tinue to use assumption of risk language to frame the analysis of acci-
dents that result from risky activities in which a plaintiff willingly,
perhaps enthusiastically, took part. Doctrinal coherence-or lack
children, violate Colorado's public policy to protect minors and create an unacceptable conflict
of interest between a minor and his parent or guardian." Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d
1229, 1237 (Colo. 2002).
75. See, e.g., Monk v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 53 F.3d 1381, 1385 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Ex-
press assumption of risk, as distinguished from implied assumption of risk, has retained its viabil-
ity as an absolute defense despite the advent of comparative negligence.").
76. See Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 677 A.2d 705, 715 (N.J. 1996) ("In the skiing
context, an inherent risk is one that cannot be removed through the exercise of due care if the
sport is to be enjoyed.").
77. See Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (hold-
ing that a collision with a plainly visible hydrant was an inherent risk of the sport).
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thereof-has taken a back seat, as parties have engaged in a highly
politicized struggle over the apportionment of liability for accidents
on the slopes.
C. Assuming the Risk of Injury on the Slopes
The modern era of personal injury litigation entered the world of
skiing with a dull thud. Descending a trail in the Green Mountains, a
skier hit a snow-covered tree stump and broke her leg. 78 A United
States federal district court in the state of Vermont used these quotid-
ian facts as an opportunity to articulate a general standard of liability
for ski accidents. In the 1951 case of Wright v. Mount Mansfield Lift,
Inc., the court held that a skier accepts those "obvious and necessary"
dangers that "inhere" in the sport of skiing, including falling over a
natural obstacle that is hidden under the snow.79 Showing great defer-
ence to the Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. opinion,80 the
court wrote,
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria applies. One who takes part
in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are
obvious and necessary ....
. Chief Justice Cardozo in the case of [Murphy] discusses the
law, which I hold to be applicable to ski accident cases .... 81
Then, in 1976, another federal case in Vermont, Leopold v. Okemo
Mountain Inc.,82 strengthened the principle that skiers legally assume
the risk of being injured on the slopes. 83 In that case, a skier who lost
control, crashed into an unpadded lift tower, and suffered fatal inju-
ries was denied recovery.84 Again, the court relied on the principle of
volenti non fit injuria:
From his past experience, [the skier] was surely cognizant of the
dangers inherent in skiing a trail of this type .... If he believed that
the trail or the towers presented risks which were too great, he
could have chosen not to proceed. Yet, he chose to ski the trail ....
As he proceeded, [the plaintiff] willingly assumed all the obvious
and necessary risks involved in this descent, including the danger
that he might collide with a tower if he lost his control or concentra-
tion for an instant.85
78. Wright v. Mount Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786, 791 (D. Vt. 1951).
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
81. Wright, 96 F. Supp. at 791. For a discussion of Murphy, see supra Part II.
82. 420 F. Supp. 781 (D. Vt. 1976).
83. See Sanders & Gayner, supra note 34, at 130.
84. See Leopold, 420 F. Supp. at 788.
85. Id. at 787.
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Although Vermont's 1970 comparative negligence statute enabled
the court to apportion responsibility for the accident to both the plain-
tiff and the defendant, the court instead imposed the full cost of the
accident on the plaintiff, emphasizing that the plaintiff must have
made a "logical . . . choice as to whether he should proceed and as-
sume the consequences of skiing in an area where a plainly apparent
and necessary danger exists."' 86 With Wright on the books, it appeared
that the owners and operators of ski resorts had little to fear from
courts.8
7
Yet the historical narrative of ski liability had already started to
change. On February 10, 1974, a twenty-one-year-old beginner skier
named James Sunday was skiing at a "speed equal to a fast walk"
when "his ski became entangled in a small bush... concealed by loose
snow."'88 He fell off the edge of the trail, struck a boulder, and was
rendered a quadriplegic.89 A jury awarded $1.5 million in damages to
Sunday. In June 1978, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected not only
the defendant's appeal, but also the applicability of Murphy and
Wright to the case.90 "[T]he timorous no longer need stay at home,"
the judge wrote in an impassioned opinion. 91 To the contrary,
There is concerted effort to attract their patronage and to provide
novice trails suitable for their use .... [N]one of [the evidence] was
calculated to show the brush to be a danger inherent in the use of a
novice slope as laid out and maintained by the defendant. 92
According to the court, because the defendant ski area was aware of
the underbrush, it "had an absolute duty to properly maintain its nov-
ice slopes free of known hidden dangers. '93
Insurers and ski mountain owners and operators reacted to the Sun-
day decision with "unmitigated panic," predicting that "an avalanche
of undefendable lawsuits" would quickly follow. 94 One commentator
hyperbolically declared that "[i]n some jurisdictions, it appears that
ski accident plaintiffs have an almost automatic right of recovery,"
and he warned that "[t]he few who assume the risk of [skiing] without
seeking redress in the law have vanished like the Pteranodon. ' 95 In-
86. Id. at 787 n.2.
87. See Sanders & Gayner, supra note 34, at 130.
88. Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 390 A.2d 398, 401 (Vt. 1978).
89. Id. at 400-01.
90. Id. at 402.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Sanders & Gayner, supra note 34, at 131 (citing Sunday, 390 A.2d at 402).
94. Id. (citing Clarence E. Hagglund, Ski Liability, 32 FFD'N INS. CouNs. Q. 223 (1982)).




surance rates'dramatically increased, sometimes three-fold, through-
out the United States, and the price of lift tickets skyrocketed. 96
Leonard H. Collier, then-vice president of American International
Group, Inc., whose American Home Assurance Company subsidiary
was one of the two major ski-area liability insurers,97 predicted to the
Wall Street Journal that the Sunday decision "could be catastrophic for
the ski industry. ' 98 The insurance industry's acute reaction to the
Sunday decision was due to several factors: (1) irritation regarding the
questionable facts of the Sunday case, namely, that the plaintiff was
drunk and had lied about the circumstances of the accident; 99 (2) dis-
appointment at the size of the award, which was $250,000 more than
the plaintiff had asked for; and (3) the belief that the Vermont Su-
preme Court had turned its back on earlier assumed risk holdings that
had been advantageous for industry for over a quarter of a century.100
Whatever the underlying cause of the industry's reaction,101 the
consequences were immediately clear: with only two major insurers
willing to provide coverage to the industry,10 2 ski mountain owners
and operators were stuck with higher premiums, the cost of which
they passed on to visiting skiers and snowboarders. As skiing became
more expensive, ski industry analysts estimated that business would
decrease by as much as twenty-five percent, forcing many small re-
sorts to close. 103 In a state like Vermont, that could mean losing as
much as $150 million annually. 10 4 In fact, after Sunday's victory in
trial court, four small Vermont ski areas closed, allegedly because of
96. See John E. Fagan, Ski Area Liability for Downhill Injuries, 49 INS. COUNS. J., Jan. 1982, at
36, 42 (1982).
97. Neil Ulman, Shaken U.S. Ski Industry Awaits Verdict on Responsibility for Downhill Acci-
dents, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1977, at 20. The other major ski area liability insurer was Lloyds, the
London insurance exchange. Id.
98. Id.
99. "According to one report, shortly after the lower court rendered its decision, a physician
claimed that Sunday had been intoxicated at the time of the accident and had admitted he did
not encounter any bush on the trail." See Wendy A. Farber, Comment, Utah's Inherent Risks of
Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol Hill, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 355, 360 n.33.
100. The belief that the Sunday court had rejected Wright is misguided, as the court in Sunday
distinguished Wright from the case at hand. "[T]he only difference between Wright and Sunday
is in their results, not in the principles of controlling law. In Wright, the defendant did not
breach any duty it owed to plaintiff; in Sunday, it did." See Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group,
Inc., 641 A.2d 765, 769 (Vt. 1994) (quoting Dillworth v. Gambardella, 970 F.2d 1113, 1119 (2d
Cir. 1992)).
101. Of course, it is also possible that the nature of the insurance business leads insurers to
overemphasize certain liability risks in an effort to justify significant rate increases.
102. See Ulman, supra note 97.




the "insurance squeeze."' 10 5 One of them, Little Underhill Ski Bowl,
shut down mid-season when its insurance premiums tripled. 106 Jack
Murphy, then-general manager of Sugarbush Mountain, explained
that while his mountain remained open for the time being, his liability
premiums had "just about doubled."'01 7 Similarly, Joseph Kohler,
then-president of Bristol Mountain in Rochester, New York, lamented
that "'[e]leven cents out of every ticket dollar we took in last year
went across the ocean to Lloyds' for liability insurance .... That
compares with about two cents 'a couple of years ago."1 0 8 When the
co-owner of Little Underhill Ski Bowl was asked by the Wall Street
Journal if she planned to reopen the following ski season, she re-
sponded, "It all depends... on how the Vermont legislature resolves a
major question that has focused the attention of ski-area operators
from Maine to California on the Green Mountain state: Who is re-
sponsible for downhill skiing accidents?"' 0 9
IV. LEGISLATING THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK: THE NSAA, THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY, AND THE STATES
Ski area operators, insurance providers, and state tourism bureaus,
each feeling newly vulnerable to tort claims brought by injured skiers,
turned to legislatures to clarify what constituted the legally assumed
risk of skiing. On June 30, 1977, just three weeks after the lower court
decision in Sunday, the NSAA "circulated a model Ski Area Safety
and Liability Act to aid state associations in drafting proposed legisla-
tion for their areas."110 According to one NSAA executive, the goal
of the act was to place "specific prohibitions on passengers and skiers
[that would] go a long way towards alleviating the strict liability inter-
pretation that is increasingly being adopted by the Courts." '' Just
before the Vermont Supreme Court's ruling in Sunday, the Vermont
legislature passed a ski safety statute, the first in the United States. It
states that "a person who takes part in any sport accepts as a matter of
law the dangers that inhere therein insofar as they are obvious and
necessary.' ' 12 The Vermont Supreme Court's ruling in the plaintiff's
favor sent ski area operators and associations across the country back
to the drawing board. They took the NSAA draft legislation to their




109. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Farber, supra note 99, at 355 n.3.
111. Id.
112. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037 (2002).
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state legislatures in an effort to "nullify Sunday's precedent and re-
establish[ ] the inherent danger law in skiing." 113 Within a few years,
most ski states had passed legislation that imposed liability on skiers
for the assumed risk of skiing, and by 1990 twenty-four ski states had
passed "assumption of risk" ski safety statutes, all of which remain in
force. 114 Today, "all but three states with any significant ski industry
have adopted a form of ski safety legislation that in some way limits
the liability of ski area operators in ski cases."" 15
Although the statutes have a common goal, they take somewhat dif-
ferent forms. 116 Some seek to reaffirm the pre-Sunday standard by
mandating that skiers assume all obvious and necessary risks inherent
in the sport. Vermont's ski safety law, for example, reads, "Notwith-
standing the provisions of [Vermont's comparative negligence statute],
a person who takes part in any sport accepts as a matter of law the
dangers that inhere therein insofar as they are obvious and neces-
sary. '117 Lest there be any ambiguity about the statute's intent, the
legislative history makes clear that its goal is to limit ski area liability
in order to keep the industry afloat:
Since 1951, the law relating to liability of operators of ski areas in
connection with downhill skiing injuries has been perceived to be
governed by the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria as set forth in the
case of Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc ..... In 1977, in the case of
Sunday v. Stratton Corporation, the Superior Court of Chittenden
County... ruled that the defense of assumption of risk was inap-
propriate ....
.... It is the purpose of this act.., to state the policy of the state
which governs the liability of operators of ski areas... by affirming
the principles of law set forth in Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc.
... which established that there are inherent dangers to be accepted
by skiers as a matter of law. 118
Other states have gone a step further than Vermont by specifically
articulating the inherent risks of skiing and barring recovery for inju-
ries resulting from such risks. Utah's statute, for example, defines the
inherent risks of skiing to include changing weather conditions, snowy
or icy conditions, surface or subsurface conditions, variations or steep-
113. James H. Chalat, Ski Law in the United States: A Practical Guide to Ski Accident Litiga-
tion II (Apr. 2, 2005) (unpublished manuscript prepared for 3rd Annual Conference Recreation
& Adventure Program Law & Liability, on file with DePaul Law Review) (citing Farber, supra
note 99, at 355 n.3 (1980)).
114. Sanders & Gayner, supra note 34, at 131-32.
115. Chalat, supra note 113, at 11.
116. Much of this classification is taken from an incisive discussion of ski safety statutes by
Sanders & Gayner, supra note 34, at 132.
117. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037 (2002).
118. Id. (Legislative Intent) (quoting 1977, No. 119 (Adj. Sess., § 2).
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ness in terrain, impact with lift towers, collisions with other skiers,
participation in competitions or special events, and the failure of a
skier to ski within the skier's own ability.119 It goes on to state that
"no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area
operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of ski-
ing."' 120 Like Vermont's law, Utah's statute is accompanied by a state-
ment of legislative intent that discusses the critical role that skiing has
played in Utah's economy, notes the need to maintain reasonable in-
surance rates, and highlights the need to limit ski area operators'
liability:
The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing ... significantly con-
tribut[es] to the economy of this state. It further finds that few in-
surance companies are willing to provide liability insurance
protection to ski area operators and that the premiums charged by
those carriers have risen sharply in recent years due to confusion as
to whether a skier assumes the risks inherent in the sport of skiing.
It is the purpose of this act, therefore.... to establish as a matter of
law that certain risks are inherent in that sport, and to provide that,
as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall
recover from a ski operator for injuries resulting from those inher-
ent risks.121
A third approach to legislating the assumption of risk, exemplified
by New York' 22 and Colorado, 2 3 identifies both the duties of ski area
operators and the duties of skiers. For example, Colorado's ski safety
statute requires ski area operators to post a series of signs and notices
with "concise, simple, and pertinent information," including the de-
gree of difficulty of a certain trail, warnings of extreme or dangerous
terrain, and notices of any man-made structures that are not clearly
visible to skiers.1 24 Likewise, the Colorado law states that "[e]ach
skier expressly accepts and assumes the risk of and all legal responsi-
bility for any injury to person or property resulting from any of the
inherent dangers and risks of skiing.' 25
Although almost every ski state has a ski safety statute, California,
despite its substantial ski industry, never adopted a ski safety statute.
Instead, with the help of an aggressive litigation strategy by plaintiff
lawyers and defense attorneys, California courts have crafted an ap-
proach to the assumption of risk doctrine that is based solely on the
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-402 (2008).
120. Id. § 78B-4-403.
121. Id. § 78B-4-401.
122. See N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 865-68 (McKinney 2002).
123. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-101 to 33-44-114 (2008).
124. Id. §§ 33-44-106, 107.
125. Id. § 33-44-109.
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common law.126 Yet, like in other states with ski safety statutes, the
California courts have also been influenced by elected officials.
Judges in California have also looked to the legislative codification of
assumed risk in other jurisdictions, particularly Michigan, when decid-
ing cases involving injuries on the slopes.127
V. FROM SERVICE ROADS TO BURIED ROCKS: SKI ACCIDENT
LITIGATION IN COLORADO, VERMONT, AND CALIFORNIA
In the aftermath of the Sunday decision and the ensuing codifica-
tion of assumed risk, disgruntled plaintiffs' lawyers attacked the ski
safety statutes as nothing more than "non-duty, special interest, im-
munity legislation.' '128  Ski industry representatives countered,
describing the statutes as simply "codifying the share[d] responsibili-
ties of the ski area and the skier" that had always existed in the com-
mon law.129 The industry maintained that by more clearly defining
the duties of skiers, the statutes provide incentives to be more safety-
conscious, thereby benefiting all parties. "For a long time, we tried to
play down the risks because we thought we were discouraging entry
into the sport," explained Joseph Kohler, president of Bristol Moun-
tain, "[b]ut now the [NSAA] has created a skiers' responsibility code
[along with its ski safety statute].' 130 The owner of Copper Mountain
in Colorado made a similar claim: with the ski safety statutes re-
minding them that they cannot bring suit for inherent dangers, skiers
will realize that "it pays to be in good condition and to ski
carefully."'131
Although lawyers for both plaintiffs and defendants vehemently
disagreed about the merits of ski safety statutes, they shared a funda-
mental assumption: the statutes had successfully codified the assump-
tion of risk, marking the end of an era of awards like those in Sunday.
Like the lawmakers who had crafted the statutes, attorneys-as well
as resort owners and operators-expected the ski statutes to enable
defendants to prevail in trial court, either through motions for sum-
mary judgment or motions to dismiss. In fact, so-called ski safety leg-
islation appeared to have so fundamentally altered the liability
landscape that injured skiers had little motivation to sue, and tort law-
yers who use contingency fee agreements lack a compelling financial
126. Telephone interview w ith John E. Fagan, Partner, Duane Morris, LLP (June 6, 2008).
127. See infra Part IV.C.
128. Chalat, supra note 113, at 11.
129. Fagan, supra note 96, at 42.




incentive to come to their aid. In the months following the passage of
the statutes, ebullient insurers and ski area operators seemed justifia-
bly confident that the new statutes would keep them out of court. 132
Perhaps not surprisingly, the operationalization of the assumption
of risk statutes became considerably more complex than the parties
predicted. Most importantly, expectations of protection for the indus-
try133 have proven to be unfounded. With each new case brought
against a ski area, judges and juries have engaged in a spirited debate
about the facts of each particular accident to determine whether the
risk was assumed by the individual skier.' 34 At the same time, courts
criticized legislative efforts to immunize ski areas, with judges clearly
voicing their resentment against legislation that ignored the distinctive
facts of individual lawsuits in order to provide immunity for ski ar-
eas. 135 The result is a rich, passionate, and highly varied collection of
conflicts in which parties-who debate the appropriate allocation of
responsibility for injuries suffered by skiers-clash over competing
conceptions of assumed risk. 136 Critically, as the following case analy-
sis reveals, there are clear differences between the approaches of the
courts in Vermont, Colorado, and California. In Vermont, which de-
nied recovery to skiers for decades and then changed course in Sun-
day, the courts occupy a middle ground, frequently imposing liability
on plaintiffs but on occasion allowing them to recover.137 Courts in
Colorado have moved from a posture that initially appeared to greatly
favor plaintiffs to one that is generally favorable to defendants. Cali-
fornia, which lacks a codified assumption of risk ski statue, has been
decidedly hostile to plaintiffs, embracing a liability regime that most
closely approximates the type sought by defendant-friendly parties
who aggressively and successfully influenced legislation elsewhere.
A. Vermont
Even before the Supreme Court of Vermont issued its opinion in
Sunday, the Vermont legislature passed the first ski safety statute in
132. Telephone interview with John E. Fagan, Partner, Duane Morris, LLP (May 5, 2008).
133. Sanders & Gayner, supra note 34, at 134-35 (describing how the ski industry believes it
has been "able to protect itself with a successful effort, led by its own attorneys, to have equita-
bly protective legislation enacted throughout the country").
134. See infra Part IV.D.
135. See, e.g., Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group Inc., 641 A.2d 765, 771 (Vt. 1994) (discussing
how, despite assumption of risk legislation in Vermont, "[sikiers should be deemed to assume
only those skiing risks that the skiing industry is not reasonably required to prevent").
136. Id.
137. See infra Part IV.A.
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the United States.138 Vermont's Sports Injury Statute, which came
into effect in 1978, is short and straightforward, stating simply that "a
person who takes part in any sport accepts as a matter of law the dan-
gers that inhere therein insofar as they are obvious and necessary. ' 139
In the wake of the trial court's decision in Sunday, legislators had ex-
pressed concern that the only two ski area insurers that operated in
the state might leave the market, which could cause the collapse of
Vermont's ski industry.1 40 The new law, they hoped, would protect ski
area owners and operators from being sued, and it would enable them
to win cases quickly through directed verdicts.141 During the three
decades since the passage of Vermont's Sports Injury Statute, how-
ever, the case law has been inconsistent. 142 While the courts in many
instances have shielded defendants from liability, plaintiffs have re-
covered in some notable cases. In many of these cases, courts have
questioned the importance of the Sunday decision and the legislation
that it inspired. 143
Decided just before the Sports Injury Statute came into effect,
Green v. Sherburne Corp. gave the Supreme Court of Vermont an op-
portunity to contain the furor unleashed by Sunday. The case was
brought on behalf of nine-year-old Brett Green, who skied into an
unpadded utility pole.144 In its judgment for the defendant, the su-
preme court emphasized that Sunday did not impose on ski area own-
ers or operators a "duty to warn concerning dangers inhering in the
sport of skiing," nor did it impose a "duty to extinguish such dan-
gers. ' 145 Seemingly backtracking from its earlier opinion in Sunday,
the court rehabilitated the views expressed three decades earlier in
Wright: skiers assume the obvious and necessary risks of skiing.
There are no published opinions involving ski accidents in Vermont
during the 1980s, which may indicate that Green, along with the ski
138. For a discussion of Sunday, see supra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
139. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037 (2002).
140. See Dillworth v. Gambardella, 970 F.2d 1113, 1117 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Following [Sunday],
the two primary ski area insurers threatened to withdraw from Vermont.... [and a] groundswell
built-up to restore the law protecting ski area operators to that which existed prior to the holding
in Sunday.").
141. Id. at 1118-19.
142. Compare Green v. Sherburne Corp., 403 A.2d 278, 279-80 (Vt. 1979) (finding an unpad-
ded utility pole to be an inherent risk of skiing), with Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc.,
641 A.2d 765, 766 (finding that an unpadded wooden ski lift post was not an inherent risk of
skiing and thus allowing for the possibility of recovery).
143. See Nelson v. Snowbridge, 818 F. Supp. 80, 83 (D. Vt. 1993) ("Although the Sunday case
appears at first glance to depart from the rules of Wright and Mt. Mansfield, in fact they differ
only in result.").




safety statute, suppressed potential claims against the ski industry. It
is also possible that conflicting interpretations of the Sunday decision
and the legislative response to that decision created a climate of un-
certainty for all parties and led them to settle rather than rely on the
courts.146 After thirteen arid years, a collision between two skiers at
Stratton in 1992 brought attention once again to the allocation of re-
sponsibility for ski-related harm in Vermont. 147 And, as in earlier
opinions, assumption of risk was at the core of the conflict.
Although Dillworth v. Gambardella involved a lawsuit brought by
an expert skier whose leg was broken in a collision with another skier,
the court's ruling once again discussed the nature of the risks inherent
in skiing. 148 At the outset of its opinion, the court expressed ambiva-
lence about the idea of assumed risk, noting its "obscure and compli-
cated" nature, the "distinctly different legal theories to which it
simultaneously refers," and the way in which it "bedevils the law be-
cause it is often used to express different and contradictory no-
tions."'1 49 It then made two observations that have influenced
subsequent litigation in Vermont. First, the court asserted that the
Vermont Sports Injury Statute does not shield the ski industry from
liability for personal injuries because saying that skiers assume the in-
herent risks of skiing "as a matter of law" leaves the question of what
counts as an inherent risk in the hands of the jury.150 By failing to
define inherent risks in the statute, it appears that the legislature
made it extremely difficult for courts to direct verdicts for defendants.
Second, the court argued that the vehement reaction to Sunday was
misplaced because "the only difference between Wright and Sunday is
in their results, not in the principles of controlling law.'' In other
words, according to the court, the law of skiing in Vermont remains as
stated in Wright-volenti non fit injuria-and neither the Sunday
holding nor the Vermont legislature significantly altered its approach
to assumed risk. 152
Just one year later, Nelson v. Snowbridge, Inc. underscored the ap-
proach of Dillworth. Joanne Nelson, an expert skier, brought suit
against Sugarbush Resort after she fell on a patch of ice, hit a tree,
146. Unfortunately, we have been unable to obtain settlement data that would allow us to
explore this possibility.
147. Dillworth v. Gambardella, 970 F.2d 1113, 1113 (2d Cir. 1992).
148. Id. at 1114-23
149. Id. at 1115, 1118.
150. Id. at 1119-20.
151. Id. at 1119.
152. Id. at 1116.
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and sustained multiple injuries, including a broken collarbone and
clavicle, a fractured skull, crushed vertebra, and fractured ribs.' 53
Citing the legislative history that accompanied the Sports Injury
Statute, the court emphasized that Vermont's legislation affirmed "the
principles of law set forth in Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc. and
Leopold v. Okemo Mountain, Inc., which established that there are
inherent dangers to be accepted by skiers as a matter of law."' 154 Like-
wise, the court emphasized that Sunday did not establish a new rule of
law, but instead differed from cases like Wright only in result. 155 Fo-
cusing on Nelson's accident, the court found the dangers she encoun-
tered both obvious and necessary. 156 In the words of the court, "Ice is
both an obvious feature of skiing and a necessary one; despite exhaus-
tive grooming efforts, ice still remains evident on at least some portion
of most ski slopes in the East .... On a double black diamond trail,
ice presents special difficulties, of which Nelson was also aware."'1 57
Unlike the Sunday court, which highlighted what ski area operators
could do to eliminate risks and dangers to skiers, the Nelson court
asked whether the danger that the plaintiff encountered was obvious
and necessary, answered affirmatively, concluded that the plaintiff
had thus assumed the risk, and found for the defendant. 58
The Supreme Court of Vermont offered a more detailed analysis of
the Sports Injury Statute in Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc.,
which involved a ten-year-old boy, Martin Frant, who was injured
when he skied into an unpadded wooden post that channeled skiers
into lift lines. 159 The trial court reasoned that Vermont's ski legisla-
tion prevented recovery "as a matter of law because Frant accepted
the 'obvious and necessary' risk posed by the corral post."1 60 The Su-
preme Court of Vermont disagreed and held that the question of
whether any given risk is obvious and necessary is a question of fact
for a jury, not a question of law for a judge. 161 The fact that the legis-
lature did not provide examples of "obvious and necessary" risks in-
herent in skiing when it drafted the Sports Injury Statute, according to
the court, indicates the legislature's acknowledgment of the fluid na-
153. Nelson v. Snowbridge, 818 F. Supp. 80, 81 (D. Vt. 1993).
154. Id. at 82. (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037 (2002)).
155. Id. at 83.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 83-84.
159. 641 A.2d 765, 766 (Vt. 1994).
160. Id.
161. Id. (stating that what constitutes an "obvious and necessary" risk is "a threshold question
of fact decided by the jury").
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ture of risks.162 When Wright was decided, the court explained, skiers
assumed the risk of colliding with snow-covered tree stumps because
grooming techniques in 1949 did not enable resort operators to detect,
remove, or warn skiers about such hazards. 163 By the time of Frant's
accident, that was no longer the case. Summarizing its view, the court
stated,
We do not think the legislature's purpose in reasonably protecting
the skiing industry is compromised by asking a jury to supply a con-
temporary sense of what constitutes an obvious or necessary risk.
Skiers should be deemed to assume only those skiing risks that the
skiing industry is not reasonably required to prevent.
164
In essence, the court deftly sidestepped the legislation, and reasserted
the authority of Vermont's courts to determine liability for the harms
resulting from skiing. Thanks to the vague language of the statute,
two decades after its influential decision in Sunday, and in the shadow
of state legislation that was clearly meant to limit the liability of ski
area owners and operators, the Supreme Court of Vermont has made
it clear that it will continue to balance the risk-taking behavior of ski-
ers with the precautions taken by ski areas when apportioning liability
for ski accidents. In doing so, it pushed back against the shield of
liability that the ski industry believed it had obtained through the po-
litical process, and it revitalized the possibility of recovery, at least for
some injured skiers.1 65
162. Id. at 770 ("In drafting [the ski safety statute], the legislature avoided cataloguing fact-
specific examples of 'obvious and necessary' risks .... [and] thereby recognized ... that yester-
day's necessary skiing risks tend to become, with the passage of time and advancement of tech-
nology, reasonably avoidable.").
163. Id.
164. Id. at 771.
165. In addition to the implied assumption of risk cases in Vermont, one case that highlights
the continuing importance of assumption of risk in the context of skiing and other dangerous
activities is Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795 (Vt. 1995). This case involved a skilled skier who
purchased a season pass to the Killington Ski Area and signed a form stating that he agreed to
freely accept and voluntarily assume the risks of injury or property damage and release
Killington Ltd., its employees and agents from any and all liability for personal injury
or property damage resulting from negligence, conditions of the premises, operations of
the ski area, actions or omissions of employees or agents of the ski area or from my
participation in skiing at the area, accepting myself the full responsibility for any and all
such damage or injury of any kind which may result.
Id. at 796. To determine the effect of this waiver, the court looked to the leading case of Tunkl v.
Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (1963). According to Tunkl,
An agreement is invalid if it exhibits some or all of the following characteristics: [1.] It
concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. [2.] The
party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the
public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public.
[3.] The party holds [it]self out as willing to perform this service for any member of the
public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established stan-
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B. Colorado
Colorado judges and the Colorado state legislature have been spar-
ring for three decades over the text of the Colorado Ski Safety Act of
1979. When setting forth the duties of skiers, the Colorado Act origi-
nally stated that "[e]ach skier has the duty to maintain control of his
speed and course at all times when skiing and to maintain a proper
lookout so as to be able to avoid other skiers and objects. ' 166 After
the Act was passed, Colorado judges issued a number of pro-plaintiff
decisions that were perceived by backers of the legislation as being
directly at odds with the dictate of the statute. 167 In response, the
legislature and the ski industry reconvened in 1990 to redraft and
strengthen the assumption of risk language in the statute.168 The post-
amendment cases demonstrate how the courts have responded to the
legislature's effort to more explicitly address assumption of risk.
Despite the 1990 statute's explicit language that skiers assume the
risks inherent in skiing, Colorado's courts have remained surprisingly
sympathetic to those who have suffered ski injuries. While the num-
ber of published ski injury cases is modest, they illustrate a pattern:
courts often deny defendants' motions for summary judgment, even
when doing so appears to contravene the language of the statute and
the intent of the legislature. In sixteen out of twenty-eight cases,
plaintiffs have either recovered damages or at least defeated summary
judgment motions, even in cases involving injuries that resulted from
dards. [4.] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of
the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bar-
gaining strength against any member of the public who seeks [the party's] services. [5.]
In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a stan-
dardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a pur-
chaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence.
[6.] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is
placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or
[the seller's] agents.
Dalury, 670 A.2d at 796 (citing Tunkl, 838 P.2d at 445-46).
The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that it is contrary to public policy to enforce a liability
waiver that prevents skiers from bringing claims against ski area owners and operators. In the
court's words, "If defendants were permitted to obtain broad waivers of their liability, an impor-
tant incentive for ski areas to manage risk would be removed with the public bearing the cost of
the resulting injuries." Id. at 799. In the court's view, although the statute imposes the inherent
risks of skiing on skiers, ski areas continue to have a duty to "warn of or correct dangers which in
the exercise of reasonable prudence in the circumstances could have been foreseen and cor-
rected." Id. at 800 (quoting Frant, 641 A.2d at 769).
166. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109(2) (2008).
167. See, e.g., Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp., 668 P.2d 982, 984-86 (Colo. Ct. App.
1983) (finding, despite the passage of the Ski Safety Act, that the ski area should have warned
the plaintiff of the risk of his injury).
168. 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1540.
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risks that were likely considered "assumed" at the time the statute was
enacted. In reaching those results, judges focused on whether particu-
lar risks were "inherent" to skiing or whether ski areas could have
eliminated them.169 Frequently, they concluded that the risk could
have been minimized or eliminated by the ski area.170 Yet the statute
retains some vitality: when courts find that a skier's injury resulted
from an inherent risk, the defendant's summary judgment motion
prevails.171
In a case decided shortly after the passage of the 1979 Ski Safety
Act, a skier sued for injuries that he sustained after he collided with a
trail grooming machine ("sno-cat"). a72 The Act states that "whenever
maintenance equipment is being employed to maintain or groom any
ski slope or trail while such trail is open to the public, a conspicuous
notice to that effect shall be placed at or near the top of that slope or
trail. ' 173 To determine whether the defendant was negligent in failing
to post signs that warned skiers about the sno-cat, the court asked
whether the risk posed by the sno-cat was inherent to the sport of
skiing, or whether the ski area could have minimized or eliminated the
injury.174 It concluded that ski areas can-and should-warn "skiers
that their path may be obstructed by heavy machinery.175
In another case decided the same year, a United States court of
appeals sitting in Colorado struggled to identify the types of risks to
be borne by skiers. After a jury returned a verdict for a skier who was
injured when he hit a rock on a ski slope,176 the defendant appealed,
arguing that while the Ski Safety Act requires ski areas "to mark man-
made obstacles on slopes that are not clearly visible in conditions of
ordinary visibility,"'' 77 it does not require ski areas to mark non-man-
made or natural objects, such as rocks.178 Despite the statute's ex-
plicit language, the court held that in addition to warning skiers of
man-made obstacles, ski areas should be required "to mark man-made
obstacles.., that are not clearly visible in conditions of ordinary visi-
169. Courts also use terms such as "obvious" and "necessary" to describe a risk or danger as
being "inherent" to the sport of skiing. See, e.g., Rimkus v. Nw. Colo. Ski. Corp., 706 F.2d 1060,
1063 (10th Cir. 1983) (describing hazards that were "obvious" to the skier).
170. See, e.g., Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp., 668 P.2d 982, 984 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
171. See, e.g., Peck v. Vail Assocs., Inc., No. 94-1015, 1995 WL 18278, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 18,
1995).
172. Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp., 668 P.2d 982, 984 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
173. Id. (quoting CoLo. REV. STAT. § 33-44-108 (1973 & Supp. 1982)).
174. Id. at 985.
175. Id.
176. Rimkus, 706 F.2d at 1061.
177. Id. at 1067 (quoting CoLo. REV. STAT. § 33-44-107(7) (1979)).
178. See Rimkus, 706 F.2d at 1067.
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bility." The court thus confirmed the district court's verdict in favor of
the plaintiff.1 79 Once again, the court creatively interpreted the Ski
Safety Act in an effort to balance a skier's responsibility and a ski
area's duty to eliminate unsafe conditions. In doing so, it concluded
that even certain natural objects could be eliminated with due care
and were thus not risks inherent to skiing.' 80
As the years passed, courts continued to engage in detailed analyses
of inherent risks, and those who thought the Ski Safety Act insulated
the industry from liability began to vocalize their disappointment. 81
Colorado Ski Country USA (CSC), the central lobbying organization
for Colorado ski areas, criticized the courts for failing to understand
that the Ski Safety Act granted blanket immunity to ski areas. 82 To
remedy the situation, CSC presented the Colorado state legislature
with a new bill and aggressively argued for its passage by noting that
despite the 1979 statute, "multimillion-dollar judgments against ski re-
sorts [continue to present] an economic burden for the industry." 183
In 1990, the Colorado legislature amended the Ski Safety Act.184 The
most significant alteration of the statute was an unequivocal "legisla-
tive declaration" about the assumption of risk:
The general assembly ... finds that, despite the passage of the "Ski
Safety Act of 1979," ski area operators of this state continue to be
subjected to claims and litigation involving accidents which occur
during the course of skiing, which claims and litigation and threat
thereof unnecessarily increase Colorado ski area operators'
costs.... [S]uch increased costs are due, in part, to confusion under
the "Ski Safety Act of 1979" as to whether a skier accepts and as-
sumes the dangers and risks inherent in the sport of skiing. It is the
purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify the law in relation to skiing
injuries and the dangers and risks inherent in that sport, to establish
as a matter of law that certain dangers and risks are inherent in that
sport, and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, no person
engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski area operator for inju-
ries resulting from those inherent dangers and risks.185
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Dev. Corp., 711 P.2d 671, 683 (Colo. 1985) (discussing
the situations in which "a skier can ordinarily guard against potentially dangerous variations in
terrain" and situations in which skiers are unable to do so.).
182. Jeffery A. Roberts, Colo. Ski Industry Wins First Legal-Liability Battle First, DENVER
POST, Jan. 31, 1990; see also John Accola, Ski Resort Liability, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 25,
1990.
183. Roberts, supra note 182; see also Accola, supra note 182 ("A 1982 ski accident in Aspen
that resulted in a $7 million jury award is being used by Colorado ski resort operators to draw
support for a new bill exempting them from liability for certain ski accidents.").




With the amended statute, the Colorado legislature and the ski in-
dustry sent an unambiguous message: courts should carefully consider
the consequences of imposing liability on ski area operators in cases
involving injured skiers. And just in case a plaintiff managed to suc-
cessfully navigate the barriers to recovery, the new Act includes a $1
million cap on damages for skiers. 18 6
Colorado's amended Ski Safety Act caused considerable contro-
versy and debate. Representative Scott McInnis, a Republican cos-
ponsor of the bill, defended the legislation to the Denver Post: "The
search for the deep pockets will come to an end with this bill .... This
is a sport that sometimes has injuries associated with it . . .[skiers]
should be careful. ' 187 In response, Representative Steve Ruddick, a
Democrat who tried unsuccessfully to remove the damages cap and to
add a provision that exempted people under eighteen years of age
from the law, '88 warned that "if injured skiers are barred from suing
to recover damages, they could become dependent on government for
medical care or other assistance," and he questioned why "[w]e've de-
cided that one industry needs charity from taxpayers. 1' 89 The Rocky
Mountain News also weighed in, publishing a powerful editorial in
support of the bill: "Skiing is dangerous . . .dangerous enough to
demand special care from those who venture onto the slopes. For
most of us, of course, the pleasure of skiing easily outranks the risk.
But it would be hypocrisy to pretend, should our luck run out, that we
don't know the score. '1 90
The conflict over the Ski Safety Act demonstrates how powerful
actors have strategically mobilized around the assumption of risk doc-
trine to further their material interests. Unconcerned with the con-
ceptual failings of the doctrine, they exploit its inherent ambiguities in
an effort to structure judicial outcomes.191 But the Colorado courts
186. Id. at 1543.




190. Editorial, Skiers Should Assume the Sport's Inherent Risks, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Feb. 1, 1990, at 58; accord Joe Garner, Lowered Liability Fails to Freeze Ski-Lift Prices, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 20, 1990, at 10 (discussing the lack of a corresponding decline in the price
of lift-tickets); Editorial, Suing for Fun and Profit: Risky Business in Ski Country, ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN NEWS, May 4, 1990, at 78 (arguing that the ski liability bill represents a stand against frivo-
lous lawsuits).
191. Parties on all sides of the issue undertook strategic mobilization in an effort to secure a
favorable legal doctrine. See John Sanki & John Accola, Ski at Own Risk, Say Lawmakers;
Measure Would Limit Liability of Resorts, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 31, 1990; John Accola,
Responsibility for Safety Debated: Skier vs. Ski Area, ROCKY MOUT-rAIN NEWS, Feb. 13, 1990.
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have not been easily contained. Since the 1990 amendments, courts
have continued to engage in a dialogue about the assumption of risk
and the meaning of "inherent risks." More than half of the fifteen
published post-amendment cases have been favorable to plaintiffs.192
The impact of the amended Ski Safety Act on the liability of ski
resort owners and operators is illustrated by cases such as Peck v. Vail
Associates, a 1995 case in which the plaintiff alleged that she suffered
serious injuries because of the defendant's negligent placement of
safety cones along the chairlift's exit ramp.193 In keeping with the
amended statute's emphasis on barring claims brought by plaintiffs
who assume the inherent risks of skiing, the court focused its analysis
on whether the risk that led to Peck's injury was "inherent," as de-
fined in the Act.194 Doing so led the court to conclude that despite
the fact that she was hurt at the exit of the chair lift, the risk which led
to her injury was "inherent," and thus, no recovery was forthcoming.
But interpretation of the statue has also gone in the opposite direc-
tion. In Graven v. Vail Associates, an experienced skier fell on slushy
snow and plunged forty to fifty feet into a steep unmarked ravine that
ran adjacent to the run. 195 The skier claimed that his injuries were
caused by the defendant's failure to warn him about the ravine. 196
The Colorado Supreme Court used the legislative history of the 1990
amendments to justify a narrow construction of the phrase "inherent
dangers and risks of skiing. ' 197 It noted that the scope of the phrase
''variations in steepness or terrain" was addressed during hearings
before the House State Affairs Committee when a ski lobby represen-
tative stated, "[S]kiers encounter terrain changes, a trail turning to the
right or left, or a trail dipping, and a skier going too fast out of control
will fall, and instead of looking to himself will sue the ski areas."'1 98
The court distinguished the conditions encountered by the plaintiff
from those considered by the legislature:
Skiing is a dangerous sport. Ordinary understanding tells us so, and
the legislature has recognized that dangers inhere in the sport. Not
all dangers that may be encountered on the ski slopes, however, are
Had the plaintiffs' bar been better positioned politically in Colorado, it may have been more
successful in battling the ski industry.
192. Of fifteen published cases since the Act was amended, eight were decided in favor of
plaintiffs, and seven in favor of defendants.
193. Peck v. Vail Assocs., Inc., No. 94-1015, 1995 WL 18278, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995).
194. Id.
195. 909 P.2d 514, 515 (Colo. 1995).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 519.
198. Id. at 519 (citing Hearings on S.B. 80 Before the H. State Affairs Comm., 57th Gen. As-
sembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Mar. 13, 1990) (Audio Tape No. 90-18.)).
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inherent and integral to the sport, and this determination cannot
always be made as a matter of law. In the present case, the plaintiff
describes the terrain that precipitated his injuries as a steep ravine
or precipice immediately next to the ski run. This description con-
jures up an image of a highly dangerous situation created by locat-
ing a ski run at the very edge of a steep drop-off. If such a
hazardous situation presents an inherent risk of skiing that need not
be marked as a danger area, the ski area operator's duty to warn...
is essentially meaningless. Therefore, we do not construe [the Act]
to include such a situation within the inherent dangers and risks of
skiing as a matter of law. 199
In distinguishing the facts of Graven from the statute's explication
of "inherent dangers," the court engaged in the type of analysis that
legislators had hoped to rein in with their 1990 amendments. Jim
Chalat, a prominent plaintiff's attorney in Colorado, describes Graven
as significant because it enables some skiers to sue operators for inju-
ries that result "not only from a ski area operator's breach of a specific
duty set out in the Ski Act, but also from a danger or risk which is
found to be not 'integral' to the sport" even though the risk appears to
be defined as an "inherent" risk by the statute.200 Because Graven
held that the determination of inherent risks is not always a matter of
law as determined by the Ski Act, but is sometimes a matter of fact,
201
it gave attorneys like Chalat hope that they might be able to get their
claims in front of juries even under the amended Act. 20 2
Graven's approach to the assumed risk of skiing was strengthened
three years later in Rowan v. Vail Holdings, Inc. In Rowan, the survi-
vors of a skier who died after striking a picnic deck brought a wrong-
ful death suit against the ski resort. 203 The court recognized that the
Ski Act bars "any claim against any ski area operator for injury result-
ing from any of the inherent dangers and risks of skiing, and that the
statute defines 'inherent risks and dangers of skiing to include impact
with . . . man-made structures and their components. ' '204 But the
Graven precedent, the court explained, meant that "the court must
consider whether dangers and risks 'are an integral part of the sport of
199. Id. at 520 (citations omitted).
200. Chalat Hatten Law Offices, P.C., Ski Areas Are Shaken by Ruling That Unnecessary
Hazards Are Not Inherent Dangers, http://www.skilaw.comljimcases-graven.html (last visited
Nov. 13, 2009).
201. Graven, 909 P.2d at 520 ("[Wle do not construe section 33-44-103(3.5) to include such a
situation within the inherent dangers and risks of skiing as a matter of law.").
202. Chalet Hatten Law Offices, supra note 200.
203. 31 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892 (D. Colo. 1998).
204. Id. at 902 (quoting CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-112, 103(3.5)) (emphasis omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
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skiing."' 205 The critical question, according to the court, is "whether a
picnic deck .. .is an integral part of skiing, i.e., whether the sport
could not be undertaken without confronting that risk. '20 6 The court
compared the picnic table to hydrants, signs, and the other objects
that are listed as inherent risks in the Ski Act, and it found that the
picnic table, in contrast to those other objects, is not essential to the
operation of a ski area.20 7 Further, the hazard of the picnic deck could
have been easily eliminated with padding. 208 Following that reason-
ing, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. 209 Other cases in Colorado have continued to demonstrate the
willingness of courts to allow plaintiffs to recover for their ski
injuries.210
Eleven years after the Colorado state legislature and ski industry
lobby collaborated to pass a strengthened liability shielding statute,
Colorado's courts have continued to engage in a dialogue about the
assumption of risk doctrine, finding it questionable whether plaintiff
skiers assumed certain risks even when the risks are defined as "inher-
ent" under the Ski Safety Act. After the 1990 amendments made it
clear that the Colorado Ski Safety Act was intended to codify the as-
sumption of risk doctrine in order to protect the financial interests of
the ski industry, courts have persisted in construing the statute in a
manner that allows courts to engage in a detailed analysis of the as-
sumption of risk when allocating liability for accidental harms on the
slopes.
C. California
Unlike Vermont and Colorado, California does not have a ski safety
statute. As a result, California's common law of torts has shaped the
205. Rowan, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (citation omitted).




210. See, e.g., Doering v. Copper Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding
that even plaintiffs harmed by inherent dangers may be able to recover). In what is now referred
to as the "Doering Rule," the court stated that the jury must first inquire as to whether the ski
area breached a statutory duty before looking into whether an inherent danger was implicated in
the plaintiff's injury because if
a jury were to find that Copper Mountain violated [the Act] and these violations con-
tributed to the injuries, the children's claims cannot be barred as an inherent danger or
risk of skiing.
.... Barring a skier's claim as an inherent danger ... before determining whether a




outcome of litigation over accidents on the slopes. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, in the absence of the codification of assumed risk and without a
clear statement from the legislature about the importance of shielding
the ski industry from liability, California courts have been more vigor-
ous in shielding the ski industry from liability than those in either Ver-
mont or Colorado.
In 1990, for example, an intermediate skier lost control on a slope in
the San Bernadino Mountains, collided with a tree, and sustained per-
manent brain damage. 211 According to the defendant, the skier, Vicki
Danieley, had assumed "any and all" risks of skiing, including the "in-
herent, obvious and unavoidable risks of participating in the sport. '212
The challenge, as the court recognized, was to determine whether the
risk was "inherent" or whether the defendant had a duty to warn ski-
ers about the tree or to remove the tree.2 13
The only relevant California precedent was a 1962 case, the first
published California opinion about a ski accident. 21 4 The court
deemed that the facts from that case were significantly different, and
it therefore looked beyond California to see how other states handled
cases involving accidents on the slopes.215 Coincidentally, a 1988
Michigan case had facts paralleling those of Danieley-there too a
skier was badly injured after colliding with a tree-and was resolved
with reference to Michigan's Ski Area Safety Act. 216 According to the
California court, Michigan's law "purports to reflect the pre-existing
common law, [so] we regard its statutory pronouncements as persua-
sive authority for what the common law in this subject-matter area
should be in California. ' 217 Central among those pronouncements
was the Michigan Act's enumeration of the inherent risks of skiing:
"injuries which can result from variations in terrain; surface or subsur-
face snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and other forms
of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their
components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly vis-
ible snow-making or snow-grooming equipment. ' 21 8 Interestingly, the
Danieley court was untroubled by the state-by-state nature of the
211. See Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Assocs., 266 Cal. Rptr. 749, 750-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
212. Id. at 751, 755.
213. Id. at 753.
214. See McDaniel v. Dowell, 26 Cal. Rptr. 140, 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962). The plaintiff was
knocked down by another skier while waiting for the towrope to take her to the top of the
mountain, and she brought a claim against both the skier and the towrope operator. Id.
215. Danieley, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 756 ("Michigan is one such state .... ).
216. See Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing Corp., 428 N.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)
(citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 408.342(2)).
217. Danieley, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
218. MICH. COMP. LAws § 408.342(2) (1962).
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common law of torts. Opining that the Michigan statute clearly stated
that the risk of colliding with a tree was inherent to the sport and was
thus assumed by the plaintiff, the Danieley court upheld summary
judgment for the defendant.219 Since the Danieley holding in 1990,
California courts have regularly referenced the Michigan legislature's
codified definition of inherent risks when deciding the merits of claims
brought by injured skiers.220
California's most important case on skiing and the assumption of
risk doctrine-Knight v. Jewett-involved touch football.221 In that
case a young woman was injured in a collision with another player
who, she claimed, ignored her request to play less aggressively. 222
Noting that "the assumption of risk doctrine has long caused confu-
sion both in definition and application," the court turned to skiing in
an effort to clarify the doctrine's meaning.223 In his plurality opinion,
Justice Ronald George stated that although a slope with moguls is
more dangerous than one without moguls, "the challenge and risks
posed by the moguls are part of the sport of skiing, and a ski resort
has no duty to eliminate them. ' 224 But he made clear that not every
risk is inherent by stating that ski resort owners and operators
have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant
over and above those inherent in the sport. Thus, although a ski
resort has no duty to remove moguls from a ski run, it clearly does
have a duty to use due care to maintain its towropes in a safe, work-
ing condition so as not to expose skiers to an increased risk of harm.
The cases establish that the latter type of risk, posed by a ski resort's
negligence, clearly is not a risk (inherent in the sport) that is as-
sumed by a participant.225
Not all of the justices concurred with Justice George's view. Justice
Stanley Mosk, for example, declared that "[t]he time has come to
eliminate implied assumption of risk. ' 226 But in cases involving in-
219. Danieley, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 756-60.
220. See, e.g., Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006);
Van Dyke v. S.K.I. Ltd., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 775, 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Wattenbarger v. Cincin-
nati Reds, Inc., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (does not involve skiing, but cites
to the Michigan statute); Handelman v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 131
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (depublished).
221. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 697 (Cal. 1992).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 699, 705.
224. Id. at 708.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 712 (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Mosk later reiter-
ated the plea he made in his Knight concurrence in Cheong v. Antablin, 946 P.2d 817, 823 (Cal.
1997) (Mosk, J., concurring) ("I would discard the confusing, and unnecessary, terminology of
'primary assumption of risk' and analyze the issue as a question of 'duty."').
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jured skiers, California's courts have continued to use the lens of as-
sumed risk, and they have regularly invoked the Knight court's
language for the principle that there is a duty to not increase the risks
of skiing beyond those that are inherent. 227 Just two years after
Knight, a skier was severely injured after he skied into a ravine that
was filled with boulders, and he brought a cause of action alleging that
the resort negligently maintained and operated its facilities. 228 Rely-
ing on Knight for the proposition that "there is no duty of care to
protect a sports participant against risks of injury that are inherent in
the sport itself," the court held that "hazardous natural forest obsta-
cles" are inherent risks of skiing, and it affirmed summary judgment in
favor of the defendant. 229
In the following year, 1995, a skier who collided with a ski lift tower
and sustained multiple fractures and partial paralysis claimed that the
metal tower was inadequately padded.230 Relying on Knight's ap-
proach to assumed risk and the list of inherent risks described in
Danieley and the Michigan Ski Act,231 the court in Connelly v. Mam-
moth Mountain Ski Area found that "collisions with ski lift towers and
their components" constitute an inherent risk, and it concluded that
the defendant, Mammoth Mountain, had no duty to protect the plain-
tiff from such an accident. 232 The court was unmoved by the plaintiff's
claim that the defendant's failure to adequately pad the lift tower in-
creased the inherent risks of skiing, declaring that it knew of "no rele-
vant legal authority in California ... requiring a ski area operator to
pad its ski lift towers. 233
Similarly, in Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., an eight-year-old in-
termediate skier suffered facial lacerations, shattered teeth, and a
fractured palate after she lost her balance and skied into the unpad-
ded nozzle of a snowmaking hydrant. 234 Once again, the court in-
voked Knight to justify analyzing the case under the primary
assumption of risk doctrine, and it referenced the catalogue of inher-
ent risks spelled out in Michigan's ski safety statute. Rejecting the
227. Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Solis v. Kirkwood
Resort Co., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
228. See O'Donoghue v. Bear Mountain Ski Resort, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 468 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
229. Id. at 468-69 (emphasis omitted).
230. See Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 857 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
231. For a discussion of Danieley, see supra notes 211-218 and accompanying text.
232. Connelly, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857-58 (emphasis omitted).
233. Id. at 858.




claim that Squaw Valley had acted carelessly by not padding the hy-
drant's nozzle, the court held that it was "not aware of any relevant
legal authority, and [had] not been directed to any, requiring a ski
area operator to pad its plainly visible snowmaking equipment. '235
Even in California, however, courts have imposed some limits on
the risks assumed by skiers. In Van Dyke v. S.K.I. Ltd., a case involv-
ing a plaintiff who fractured his spine and was rendered paraplegic
after he collided with a directional signpost (which ironically said "be
aware-ski with care") on a slope at Bear Valley, the trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because "the
risk of hitting something like this, whether it's a signpost or a pole
supporting a ski lift or snow making equipment or trees, is a risk of
injury that's inherent in the sport. '236 However, the appellate court
distinguished cases that involved ski towers from those that involve
other objects, noting that the signpost in this case was difficult for the
plaintiff and other skiers to see.237 The owners and operators of ski
areas, the court concluded, have a duty to ensure that signs on the
slopes are plainly visible to all skiers.238 On remand, however, the
paraplegic plaintiff, who was an atiorney, was also unable to pre-
vail.239 After the plaintiff refused a settlement offer of $500,000 and
insisted on a payment of over $3 million, the case was retried, result-
ing in a verdict for the defense.240
D. Comparing Liability for Ski Accidents in Vermont,
Colorado, and California
In each of the three states in which we have examined legal conflicts
over ski accidents, disputes are adjudicated by using the language of
assumed and inherent risk. The ski industry has an important eco-
nomic presence in all of the states because they employ large numbers
of people, attract tourists, and generate significant tax revenue.
Through a successful lobbying effort that aimed to minimize if not
eliminate resort liability for the injuries suffered by skiers, the ski in-
dustry secured legislation in Vermont and Colorado that codified the
235. Id. at 393.
236. Van Dyke v. S.K.I. Ltd., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 775, 777 & n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
237. Id. at 777, 779 ("Van Dyke could not see the face of the sign because he approached it at
about a 90 degree angle. None of Van Dyke's ski companions saw the sign. Indeed, two of them
missed the crossover trail.").
238. Id. at 779.
239. DUANE MORRIS, LLP, SAMPLE LIST OF TRIALS & SUMMARY JUDGMENTS 13 (on file with
author).
240. Premises Liability: Accident at Ski Area Defense Verdict: Paraplegia, PERSONAL INJURY
VERDICT REvs., Oct. 25, 2000.
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assumption of risk doctrine. Why no such legislation exists in Califor-
nia is unclear. Some attorneys have suggested that the industry was
concerned about a backlash from the courts if it pressed for legisla-
tion, and others have speculated that the California legislature was
less receptive to ski safety legislation than were those in Vermont and
Colorado.241
Even in the two states with protective legislation-Colorado and
Vermont-the approaches of the state legislatures diverge. In Ver-
mont, the legislature passed an extremely general law stating that "a
person who takes part in any sport accepts as a matter of law the dan-
gers that inhere therein insofar as they are obvious and necessary. '242
Lawmakers in Colorado tried a similar approach in 1979, but dissatis-
faction with the results of cases reaching the courts caused the ski in-
dustry to pressure legislators for a far more specific law, which
resulted in a series of amendments in 1990.243 The amended law is
prefaced by a statement of concern about litigation that "unnecessa-
rily increase[s] Colorado ski area operators' costs," 244 and it goes on
to catalogue the inherent dangers of skiing, including the following:
changing weather conditions; snow conditions as they exist or may
change, such as ice, hard pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack,
corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, and machine-made snow; surface or
subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, rocks,
stumps, streambeds, cliffs, extreme terrain, and trees, or other natu-
ral objects, and collisions with such natural objects; impact with lift
towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures, hydrants, water pipes, or
other man-made structures and their components; variations in
steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design,
snowmaking or grooming operations, including but not limited to
roads, freestyle terrain, jumps, and catwalks or other terrain modifi-
cations; collisions with other skiers; and the failure of skiers to ski
within their own abilities.245
Consequently, Vermont, Colorado, and California share the com-
mon law doctrine of assumed risk, and in each there is an economi-
cally important and politically powerful industry seeking to avoid
liability for ski accidents. Yet industry presence has not had a uniform
impact. Instead, legislatures have taken different approaches in Ver-
mont and Colorado, and they have remained on the sidelines in Cali-
fornia. Case outcomes have been similarly varied. Defendants have
fared reasonably well in Vermont, but recent cases that underscore ski
241. Telephone interview John E. Fagan, Partner, Duane Morris, LLP (June 6, 2008).
242. VT. STAT. Ar. tit. 12, § 1037 (2002).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 166-169.
244. 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1540.
245. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-103(3.5) (2006).
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industry dutieg raise the possibility that courts will begin apportioning
liability in ski cases, in conformance with the state's comparative fault
statute. Colorado's courts, despite the legislature's two efforts to limit
the liability of ski resorts, have continued to play the role of the
spoiler by engaging in detailed textual analysis of the meaning of "in-
herent risks" and reaching results that are surprisingly favorable to
plaintiffs. California is perhaps the biggest anomaly: even in the ab-
sence of legislation that codifies the assumption of risk and shields the
ski industry from liability, the courts have regularly sided with the in-
dustry at the expense of injured skiers.
Why have the California courts, in the absence of a statute that cod-
ifies the assumption of risk doctrine, embraced a common law ap-
proach to assumed risk that is more favorable to defendants than the
most narrowly tailored legislation? And why have courts in states
with legislation intended to shield the ski industry from liability
thwarted the intent of the legislature and continued to award damages
to at least some injured skiers? There are of course many differences
between the states, and thus many possible comparative explanations.
The general political profile of each state, for example, might affect
the apportionment of tort liability in ski-related claims. Although
Vermont, Colorado, and California are all "blue" states, California is
the most liberal, and Colorado is the most conservative of the three.246
To the extent that liberal values are equated with pro-plaintiff out-
comes, therefore, generalized political ideology does little to explain
the outcome of the ski cases discussed herein. Perhaps a more fine-
grained examination of state politics would reveal that ski claims are
more often brought to California courts that are located in the state's
most conservative areas, while claims in Vermont and Colorado are
more often heard by those states' most liberal locales. Our data are
not sufficiently specific to enable such an analysis, but we are skeptical
of the possibility of explaining the different outcomes of assumed risk
cases with such crude political measures.
In addition to the political configuration of the states, various other
factors are worth examining to determine whether they have an im-
pact on the outcome of ski-related assumed risk cases. For example,
the relative size and power of the ski industry, and its willingness to
expend resources in an effort to influence the legal process by, for
example, making contributions to judicial election campaigns, could
alter the outcomes of ski cases. So too could the structure of the state
246. See Statistical Modeling, Causal Inference, and Social Science: Ranking States by the
Liberalism/Conservatism of Their Voters, http://www.stat.columbia.edu/-cooklmovabletype/
archives/2008/06/ranking.states.html (June 30, 2008, 24:53 EST).
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court system; for example, because Vermont has no intermediate ap-
pellate courts, the supreme court hears final appeals from all cases
originating in trial courts, whereas both California and Colorado have
intermediate appellate courts that insulate the supreme courts from a
wide range of appeals. Different approaches to the apportionment of
liability may also come into play. In Vermont, plaintiffs can recover
even if they are no more than fifty percent at fault, while in Colorado
only plaintiffs who are less at fault than defendants can recover.247
California has a pure comparative fault rule, which enables plaintiffs
to recover even if they are more than fifty percent at fault.2 48 Yet
none of these factors appears to explain the pattern of liability that we
have observed.
One explanation that finds some support in our research is that leg-
islative involvement appears to be counterproductive. That is, when
the legislature stays out of the way, the courts are inclined to treat
skiers as having assumed the risk of injury on the slopes.249 But when
the legislature codifies assumed risk in an effort to shape judicial rul-
ings about ski accident cases, the courts are not easily contained.250
Judges on the California bench, for example, do not need to push back
against the action of the legislature because the latter has not sought
to legislate the outcomes of ski accident claims. By contrast, the exis-
tence of ski safety legislation may serve as an invitation for courts in
Colorado to grapple with the imperfect efforts of legislatures to codify
the assumption of risk doctrine, and in doing so they find gaps in the
laws that enable plaintiff recovery. This tendency may be exacerbated
by judges who consider legislative involvement with the assumption of
risk doctrine an inappropriate political intrusion into the common law
and who want to reestablish what they believe to be the court's legiti-
mate province. In short, without legislative codification of assumed
risk shadowing and shaping their decisions, judges in California have
not felt the need to "fight" the legislation in their opinions. Ironically,
the result is that the California courts are approaching the assumption
of risk in ski cases just as the ski safety statutes in other states envision
judicial action and outcomes.
Yet, the apparent lack of legislation in California is compromised by
two factors. First, California's courts have regularly looked to Michi-
247. Mathisen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C., Contributory Negligence/Comparative Fault Laws,
http://www.mwl-law.comlPracticeAreas/Contributory-Neglegence.asp (listing states with con-
tributory and comparative negligence laws).
248. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
249. See, e.g., Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389, 391-92 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).
250. See, e.g., Rimkus v. Nw. Colo. Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060, 1061 (10th Cir. 1983).
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gan's Ski Area Safety Act for guidance on the assumed risk of skiing.
In doing so, the courts have benefited from legislation that details the
risks of skiing and the duties of skiers and ski resorts without feeling
constrained by local elected officials. Second, although the California
state legislature has not enacted a ski safety statute, local government
has, at times, stepped in to fill at least some of the gap. The most
significant example is in Placer County, located in and around the Si-
erra Nevada Mountains, which is perhaps the most economically im-
portant ski region in the state. Sugar Bowl, the first ski area in the
county, opened in 1939, followed by Squaw Valley, Alpine Meadows,
Homewood Mountain Resort, Royal Gorge, and Northstar-at-
Tahoe. 251 Together, these six resorts have close to one hundred ski
lifts and have hosted prestigious international ski events like the 1960
Winter Olympics. 2 52 In 1984, the Placer County Board of Supervisors
enacted a Skier Responsibility Code that echoes state ski safety stat-
utes by providing that "[a]ny individual or group of individuals who
engage in the sport of skiing of any type ... shall assume and accept
the inherent risks of such activities insofar as the risks are reasonably
obvious, foreseeable or necessary to the activities. '253 The Code goes
on to specify the inherent risks of skiing, as well as to spell out certain
duties of skiers. 254 Whatever the legal effect of Placer County's ordi-
nance-the California Supreme Court has not resolved either the
question of whether Placer County's Skier Responsibility Code estab-
lishes a local duty that gives rise to tort liability or whether the crea-
tion of local duties means that similar acts of plaintiffs in different
parts of the state would lead to different results in tort claims-it is
clear that politics is as much a part of assumed risk in California as
elsewhere.255
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a powerful intuitive appeal to the idea that individuals who
engage in risky activities should bear the costs of their accidents, and
tort law has long captured that idea in the doctrine of assumption of
risk. One need look no further than the legal conflict over smoking
251. SACRAMENTO REG'L RESEARCH INST., PLACER CoUNTY ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC
PROFILE 2008, at 112 fig. 79 (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.placer.ca.gov/News/2008/March/
DemoProfile.aspx.
252. Id. at 112 & fig. 79.
253. Placer County Code §§ 9.28.010, 9.28.030 (2009).
254. Id. §§ 9.28.040 to 9.28.060.
255. See Cheong v. Antablin, 946 P.2d 817, 824-26, 828 (Cal. 1997), in which the justices
staked out a range of differing positions on the impact of a local ordinance on California's com-
mon law of torts.
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for an example of how the American public has internalized the view
that risk-takers are responsible for the consequences of their actions.
Smokers suffering from lung cancer and other diseases began to sue
tobacco companies in the 1950s, relying heavily on a series of epidemi-
ological studies that demonstrated a link between smoking and vari-
ous health problems.2 56 As evidence of a causal relationship between
smoking and cancer became increasingly indisputable, sick smokers
continued to bring claims of both negligence and strict liability against
the tobacco industry. 257 Even more smokers filed cases with the
courts after internal company documents, which indicated that the in-
dustry had intentionally misled the public about the dangers of smok-
ing, were made public.258 Yet for over forty years after the first cases
were filed, plaintiffs failed to recover, and their success was only mar-
ginally improved when the scientific basis of their claims was strength-
ened and the malfeasance of the industry came to light.2 59 Although
there are a number of reasons for the failure of smokers' tort claims,
among the most important is that juries consistently found that smok-
ers made an informed decision to smoke, and as a result, they were
responsible for the consequences of their decision. Having "assumed
the risk" of smoking, in other words, smokers gave up the opportunity
of recovering for their injuries.
Although juries have consistently found arguments based on the
idea of the assumed risk of smoking to be compelling, many tort law
scholars and a number of influential judges have been sharply critical
of the doctrine of assumption of risk.260 Like Justice Felix Frankfurter
more than a half-century ago, leading contemporary tort law thinkers
continue to write lengthy, doctrinally sophisticated pieces that pick
apart the idea of assumed risk and advocate that it be eliminated from
the lexicon of tort law. The result is a curious misfit between the
"common sense" of the public, as expressed by juries, and the views of
learned experts like scholars and judges.
In this Article, we have stepped back from the polarized doctrinal
debate over the assumption of risk doctrine and focused on the sociol-
ogy and politics of assumed risk. Skiing is an ideal window through
which to examine the assumption of risk doctrine because determining
liability for ski accidents requires a complex balancing of three key
256. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 853, 856-57 (1992).
257. Id.
258. See Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING To-
BACCO 176, 185 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
259. Id. at 176, 185.
260. See supra notes 45-109 and accompanying text.
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factors: the knowledge that skiing is dangerous and will inevitably
cause some injuries; the deeply ingrained individualism of American
legal culture that calls for skiers to be accountable for their own ac-
tions; and the tort goals of deterrence and risk-spreading, which coun-
sel that resort owners and operators should have an incentive to offer
skiers a reasonably safe skiing environment. 261 Litigation over ski ac-
cidents in Vermont, Colorado, and California illustrates how the lan-
guage of assumed risk is used as shorthand to discuss the clash
between individual freedom to engage in risky activities and the gen-
eral duty of care that requires people to act reasonably so as to reduce
accidental harm to others. The wide-ranging and contradictory case
holdings in the three states make clear that there is no recipe for how
that balance should be struck. Regardless of its flaws, the language of
assumed risk captures the tension between individual freedom, per-
sonal responsibility, and the prevention of unexpected risk, and
neither scholars nor courts have found an alternative formulation that
has wide appeal. In sum, the doctrine of assumed risk has withstood
decades of criticism because of its resonance with society-as seen in
jury decisions-and of its utility to courts and lawyers. Despite com-
pelling and consistent academic critique, the assumption of risk doc-
trine remains firmly embedded in tort law, and there is no sign that it
is likely to disappear.
The interaction of tort doctrine with social values and beliefs, how-
ever, is only part of the reason why the assumption of risk doctrine
has remained a critical part of tort law. Equally important, we argue,
is the impact of political and economic interests on the determination
of the types of risks that are assumed and the allocation of accident
costs when such risks lead to injuries. The ski industry and the insur-
ance industry remain critically interested in how the cost of ski acci-
dents is apportioned, and together they have lobbied aggressively for
state ski safety statutes that shield the industry from liability.262 From
one perspective, they have been extremely successful: every major ski
state except California has passed some form of legislation that pro-
tects ski resort owners and operators from personal injury liability.
Yet, as we demonstrated in our discussion of ski accident cases in Ver-
mont, Colorado, and California, courts have varied widely in their in-
terpretation of the statutes. And despite the absence of protective
legislation, the California courts have been the least accommodating
261. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985) (discussing the high de-
gree to which Americans have developed expectations of recompense for whatever injuries they
suffer).
262. See supra notes 122-255 and accompanying text.
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to plaintiffs. In short, what may appear to be a jurisprudential and
doctrinal debate over the assumption of risk is in fact powerfully
shaped by the political, economic, and cultural climate in which the
debate has taken place.
It should not be surprising that legal doctrines-in this case, the
assumption of risk doctrine-are a product not simply of jurispruden-
tial considerations but also of economics, politics, and social values.
Generations of legal sociologists have made that point with great suc-
cess in the legal academy. 263 When it comes to the assumption of risk
doctrine, however, it seems that their message has been forgotten.
With almost no exceptions, the literature on assumed risk is doctrinal,
and even scholars who often highlight the political or sociological
dimensions of tort doctrine have been drawn into a more conven-
tional, technical debate. In this Article, we have argued that it is more
useful to analyze how the assumption of risk doctrine operates in
practice than to parse hypotheticals. The scholarly community may
distain the phrase "assumption of risk," but it needs to examine care-
fully how and when attorneys for defendants and plaintiffs invoke the
assumed risk doctrine, the ways in which judges and juries use the
concept to justify their rulings, and the reasons why politicians codify
the assumption of risk doctrine in legislation. Not doing so threatens
to make tort scholars secondary players in an important and ongoing
conversation about the allocation of the cost of accidents in a wide
range of so-called risky activities.
263. See, e.g., LAW & SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW (Stewart Macaulay,
Lawrence M. Friedman & John Stookey eds., 1995).
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